Altruism and its impact on the price of anarchy by Chen, P. (Po-An) et al.
17
Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy
PO-AN CHEN, National Chiao Tung University
BART DE KEIJZER, CWI Amsterdam
DAVID KEMPE, University of Southern California
GUIDO SCH ¨AFER, CWI Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model
altruistic behavior by assuming that player i’s perceived cost is a convex combination of 1 − αi times his
direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi allows smooth interpolation between purely
selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study primarily altruistic extensions of
(atomic and nonatomic) congestion games, but also obtain some results on fair cost-sharing games and valid
utility games.
We derive (tight) bounds on the price of anarchy of these games for several solution concepts. Thereto, we
suitably adapt the smoothness notion introduced by Roughgarden and show that it captures the essential
properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games. Our bounds show that for atomic
congestion games and cost-sharing games, the robust price of anarchy gets worse with increasing altruism,
while for valid utility games, it remains constant and is not affected by altruism.
However, the increase in the price of anarchy is not a universal phenomenon: For general nonatomic
congestion games with uniform altruism, the price of anarchy improves with increasing altruism. For atomic
and nonatomic symmetric singleton congestion games, we derive bounds on the pure price of anarchy that
improve as the average level of altruism increases. (For atomic games, we only derive such bounds when cost
functions are linear.) Since the bounds are also strictly lower than the robust price of anarchy, these games
exhibit natural examples in which pure Nash equilibria are more efficient than more permissive notions of
equilibrium.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.0 [Theory of Computation]: General
General Terms: Economics, Theory
Additional KeyWords and Phrases: Altruism, selfishness, congestion games, cost-sharing games, valid utility
games, price of anarchy
ACM Reference Format:
Po-An Chen, Bart de Keijzer, David Kempe, and Guido Scha¨fer. 2014. Altruism and its impact on the price
of anarchy. ACM Trans. Econom. Comput. 2, 4, Article 17 (October 2014), 45 pages.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2597893
Most of the results in this article have appeared in preliminary form in Proceedings of 7th Workshop on
Internet & Network Economics (WINE’11) [Chen et al. 2011] and in Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce (EC’08) [Chen and Kempe 2008].
Author’s addresses: P.-A. Chen, Institute of Information Management, National Chiao Tung University,
Taiwan; email: poanchen@nctu.edu.tw; B. de Keijzer, Networks and Optimization Group, CWI Amsterdam,
The Netherlands; email: b.de.keijzer@cwi.nl; D. Kempe, Department of Computer Science, University of
Southern California, USA; email: dkempe@usc.edu; G. Scha¨fer, Networks and Optimization Group, CWI
Amsterdam and Department for Econometrics and Operations Research, VU University Amsterdam, The
Netherlands; email: g.schaefer@cwi.nl.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by
others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to
post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions
from permissions@acm.org.
c© 2014 ACM 2167-8375/2014/10-ART17 $15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2597893
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 2, No. 4, Article 17, Publication date: October 2014.
17:2 P.-A. Chen et al.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many large-scale decentralized systems, such as infrastructure investments or traf-
fic on roads or computer networks, bring together large numbers of individuals with
different and oftentimes competing objectives. When these individuals choose actions
to benefit themselves, the result is frequently suboptimal for society as a whole. This
basic insight has led to a study of such systems from the viewpoint of game the-
ory, focusing on the inefficiency of stable outcomes. Traditionally, “stable outcomes”
have been associated with pure Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. The no-
tions of price of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] and price of stability
[Anshelevich et al. 2004] provide natural measures of the system degradation, by cap-
turing the degradation of the worst and best Nash equilibria, respectively, compared to
the socially optimal outcome. However, the predictive power of such bounds has been
questioned on (at least) two grounds.
(1) The assumption that players seek only to maximize their own utility is at odds with
altruistic behavior routinely observed in the real world, and predicted by widely
accepted evolutionary models. While modeling human incentives and behavior ac-
curately is a formidable task, several papers have proposed natural simplified
models of altruism [Ledyard 1997; Levine 1998].
(2) The adoption of Nash equilibria as a prescriptive solution concept implicitly as-
sumes that players are able to reach such equilibria. In particular in light of sev-
eral known hardness results for finding Nash equilibria, this assumption is very
suspect for computationally bounded players. In response, recent work has begun
analyzing the outcomes of natural response dynamics [Blum et al. 2006, 2008;
Roughgarden 2009], as well as other permissive solution concepts such as corre-
lated or coarse correlated equilibria [Aumann 1974; Hannan 1957; Roughgarden
and Schoppmann 2011]. This general direction of inquiry has become known as
“robust price of anarchy.”
The goal of this article is to begin a thorough investigation of the effects of relaxing
both of these assumptions. That is, we consider the (relaxed) equilibria reached by
individuals whose utility functions contain a component of social welfare. We aim to
quantify the worst-case (and in some cases, best-case) inefficiency of such equilibria.
More concretely, we study the following classes of games (all of which are defined
formally in Section 2).
Congestion Games. In congestion games [Roughgarden 2005; Roughgarden and Tar-
dos 2000], there is a set of facilities, each equipped with a nondecreasing cost (or delay)
function. These facilities could be roads in a road network, links in a computer network,
or computational resources in a system. All of these resources become slower as the load
on them increases. Individuals have strategy spaces consisting of subsets of resources,
such as paths in a network, or sets of machines which can together finish a computa-
tional task. Among the different feasible sets, they will choose one to optimize their
individual objective function. As a result, selfish choices can lead to overcongestion of
resources that would be much faster if used in moderation.
Congestion games naturally fall into two classes: atomic and nonatomic. In atomic
congestion games, individuals have nonnegligible size: even one individual will af-
fect the cost of a facility perceptibly by using vs. not using it. In nonatomic con-
gestion games, individuals are infinitesimally small, and there is a continuum of
them. Thus, any one individual will not affect the perceived cost of a facility, and
it is only the accumulation of a set of positive measure that will affect the facility’s
cost.
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Fair Cost-Sharing Games. Fair cost-sharing games [Anshelevich et al. 2004] also
have a set of facilities, but instead of increasing the cost, the selection of a facil-
ity by many individuals will actually decrease it for each of the individuals using
it. The reason is that here, selecting a facility means contributing towards its pur-
chase: the (fixed) cost of each facility is split among all individuals contributing
to it. Thus, cost-sharing games naturally model private investment in infrastruc-
ture where overall lower cost could possibly be obtained by maximizing overlap of
purchased facilities. While fair cost-sharing games are thus also congestion games,
their objective function behaves very differently, so that we treat them separately
here.
Valid Utility Games. Valid utility games [Vetta 2002] also have individuals select-
ing sets of facilities, but instead of minimizing costs, individuals seek to maximize
the utility they individually derive from the set of facilities selected by all players
together. The social welfare also depends on the entire set of facilities selected by all
individuals together. Thus, valid utility games naturally model investments in infras-
tructure where society loses some welfare by possible duplication between individuals’
choices.
We are interested in the outcomes of these games reached by partially altruistic
players. In Section 3, we formally define the altruistic extension for finite (atomic)
games and for nonatomic congestion games. Our general definition is applicable to
other classes of games, and is our main modeling contribution. The model is based on
a suggestion of Ledyard [1997, p. 154]. In the version for atomic games, each player
i has an associated altruism parameter αi, and player i’s cost (or payoff) is a convex
combination of (1 − αi) times his direct cost (or payoff) and αi times the social cost (or
social welfare). By tuning the parameters αi, this model allows smooth interpolation
between pure selfishness (αi = 0) and pure altruism (αi = 1). For non-atomic games,
we argue (also in Section 3) that the natural analogue is to consider the derivative of
the social cost or social welfare.
As discussed previously, the second modeling contribution of our work is to consider
more permissive solution concepts than pure Nash equilibria, allowing us to study the
joint effects of relaxing both standard assumptions. Most of our results are valid for
coarse correlated equilibria and limits of best-response dynamics (defined in Section 2),
using an extension of the smoothness technique of Roughgarden [2009], which consti-
tutes the second modeling contribution of the present work. (Some results in our work
only hold for pure Nash equilibria, and delineate quantitative differences between the
different solution concepts.)
1.1. Our Contributions and Results
As discussed previously, our first main contribution is in terms of modeling: we propose
a clean model of altruism that applies to most games, and extend Roughgarden’s model
of smoothness to it (Section 3). We provide several general results that will be useful to
analyze the robust price of anarchy for games with altruism in our and other scenarios
(Section 3.3). We then investigate congestion games with altruism in depth, and also
show how to apply the general methodology to other games.
(1) For atomic congestion games with linear cost functions, Caragiannis et al. [2010]
derived a tight bound of 5+4α2+α on the pure price of anarchy when all players have the
same altruism level α.1 Our general framework makes it an easy observation that
1The altruism model of Caragiannis et al. [2010] differs from ours in a slight technicality discussed in
Section 3 (see Remark 3.2). Therefore, various bounds we cite here are stated differently in Caragiannis
et al. [2010].
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their proof in fact bounds the robust price of anarchy. We generalize their bound to
the case when different players have different altruism levels, obtaining a bound in
terms of the maximum and minimum altruism levels. (These results are presented
in Section 4.)
For the special case of symmetric singleton congestion games with linear cost
functions (which corresponds to selfish scheduling on machines), we can analyze
some caseswith nonuniform altruism.When an α¯ fraction of the players are entirely
altruistic and the remaining players are entirely selfish, we obtain an improved
bound of 4−2α¯3−α¯ on the pure price of anarchy. (These bounds are proven in Section 5.)
(2) For nonatomic congestion games, we are able to bound the robust price of anarchy
for any given class of cost functions on resources in terms of an optimization problem
for those functions. When cost functions can be arbitrary semiconvex functions, we
show that if all players are (at least) α-altruistic, then the robust price of anarchy
is always bounded by 1
α
. For the special case of linear cost functions, our general
bound implies a robust price of anarchy of 43+2α−α2 . (These results are the subject of
Section 6.)
We also study the special case of symmetric singleton congestion games with
arbitrary altruism distributions. We give a theorem characterizing the pure price
of anarchy for any given class of cost functions and arbitrary altruism distributions.
When the cost functions are semiconvex, the theorem implies a bound of 1
α¯
on the
pure price of anarchy, where α¯ is the mean of the altruism distribution. (These
bounds are proven in Section 7.)
(3) For fair cost-sharing games, our framework lets us easily derive a bound of n1−αˆ on
the robust price of anarchy, where αˆ is the maximum altruism level of a player. This
bound is tight for uniformly altruistic players. (This result is shown in Section 8.)
(4) For valid utility games, using our framework, we prove a tight bound of 2 on the
robust price of anarchy. The bound remains at 2 regardless of the (possibly different)
altruism levels of the players. (The proof is given in Section 9.)
(5) We study the general properties of the robust price of anarchy for abitrary classes
of games. We prove that the robust price of anarchy behaves in a quasiconvex way.
As a consequence, the worst-case robust price of anarchy is achieved at a {0,1}-
altruism vector. Moreover, the set of altruism parameters for which the best price
of anarchy is achieved is convex. (This is proved in Section 10.)
Notice that many of our bounds on the robust price of anarchy reveal a counter-
intuitive trend: For utility games, the price of anarchy is independent of the level
of altruism. For atomic linear congestion games and cost-sharing games, it actually
increases in the altruism level (and even goes to infinity in the case of cost-sharing
games). Intuitively, this phenomenon is explained by the fact that a change of strategy
by player i may affect many players. An altruistic player will care more about these
other players than a selfish player; hence, an altruistic player accepts more states of
the game as “stable.” This suggests that the best stable solution can also be chosen
from a larger set, and the price of stability should thus decrease. We provide some
preliminary results on the price of stability which support this intuition: for linear
atomic congestion games, we derive an upper bound on the price of stability which
decreases as 21+α ; similarly, for cost-sharing games, we establish an upper bound which
decreases as (1 − α)Hn + α.
The increase in the price of anarchy is not a universal phenomenon: for nonatomic
congestion games with altruism, the price of anarchy improves with increasing altru-
ism. This raises the interesting question of which type of system behavior one should
more likely expect in reality. The answer to this question may depend on the structure
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of the game, the levels of altruism, and the equilbrium concept. We are not aware of
any systematic real-world study that has investigated this phenomenon; this is not too
surprising, given the incredibly high number of variables one would need to control
for. At a very high level, it appears that apparently altruistic behavior, with positive
outcomes for social welfare, is frequently engaged in, for example, in environmentally
conscious behavior of individuals.
1.2. Altruism: A Discussion
In this work, we adopt a fairly simple linear model of altruistic behavior in games.
To the best of our knowledge, the first published suggestion of a similar model is
due to Ledyard [1997]. Of course, a simple linear model should not be expected to
accurately capture the behavior of rational agents; instead, our modeling goal is to
derive qualitative insights regarding whether and what kind of impact altruism will
have on the outcome of games.
That said, the type of linear expression we use is supported by widely accepted
models in evolutionary biology. Hamilton’s Rule [Hamilton 1963, 1964] (see also [West
et al. 2011]) states the following: Let A, Bbe two agents, and r ∈ [0,1] a measure of how
related they are, for example, in terms of genetic overlap. Consider some action, which
has a cost of cA for A and will provide a benefit of uB to B. Hamilton’s rule states that
we would expect for A to undertake the action if r · uB > cA. Indeed, as is well known
among evolutionary biologists, behavior that appears altruistic (and thus irrational)
is frequently explained as rational and selfish if the agents are taken to be the genes
rather than the phenotypes. When the relatedness between A and B is not readily
apparent to individual A in the above example, then the level of altruism we would
expect to see would correspond to the average relatedness in the population.2 Indeed,
as explained by West et al. [2011] in detail, many alternative behavioral or economic
models explaining altruism reduce to Hamilton’s rule once relatedness uncertainty and
population mixing are taken into account.
Besides models based on linear combinations of individual players’ costs (as well
as social welfare), several other approaches have been studied. Generally, altruism
or other “other-regarding” social behavior has received attention in the behavioral
economics literature (e.g., Gintis et al. [2005]). Fehr and Schmidt [2005] summa-
rize theoretical models of other-regarding preferences that attempt to explain ob-
served experimental evidence in different experiments. There are three main different
approaches:
—Models of “social preferences” assume that a player’s preference does not only depend
on his own material payoff, but may also be a function of the allocation of resources
to other players. Some simpler models such as the one proposed by Ledyard [1997]
as well as ours fall into this category.
—Models of “interdependent preferences” assume that players care about another
player’s “type.” For example, suppose that each player may be either of selfish type
or conditionally altruistic type. If an altruistic player is aware that he interacts with
another altruistic player, his preference becomes altruistic, and he is willing to be
generous; if he knows that he interacts with a selfish player, his preference is to
act selfishly. Some concrete examples of models in this approach include the one
proposed by Levine [1998].
2At a level of individuals, or even larger groups, irrational altruistic behavior can of course arise from
misestimating the relatedness r, or from following simple behavioral rules derived for certain relatedness
values.
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—Models of “intention-based reciprocity” assume that players are concerned with other
players’ intentions. If a player perceives that the other player intends to treat him
kindly, he will try to reciprocate and be kind to the other player, too; if he feels that
the other player has hostile intentions, he will want to hurt that player. Thus, a
player’s interpretation of the other player’s behavior matters crucially in this mod-
eling approach. Alternative models such as the ones proposed by Rabin [1993] and
by Geanakoplos et al. [1989] belong to this category and are designed more with
the goal of modeling the psychological processes underlying spite or altruism (and
reciprocity): they involve players forming beliefs about other players.
As a result, most models in the second or third approach are well suited for experi-
mental work, but perhaps not as directly suited for the type of analysis in this article.
They try to explain actual human behavior and the outcomes of economic experiments.
To the best of our knowledge, our focus in this article on the effects of other-regarding
behavior on social welfare has not appeared in the behavioral economics literature.
A discussion of some of their advantages and disadvantages can also be found in the
survey by West et al. [2011]. Distinguishing altruism, reciprocity, inequality aversion
and other types of other-regarding behavior from experimental evidence can be chal-
lenging. For a discussion of experimental designs and results partly disambiguating
motivations, see the classic paper by Charness and Rabin [2002].
The model of altruism used in our work can be naturally extended to include αi < 0,
modeling spiteful behavior. While the modeling extension is natural, many results in
this and other papers do not continue to hold directly for negative αi.
1.3. Taxes and Stackelberg Strategies
Our definition of partial altruism naturally relates to two strategies that have been
proposed in the literature for dealing with the selfishness of players: Pigou taxes and
Stackelberg strategies.
The idea of taxes or tolls from a mechanism design viewpoint is to discourage players
from choosing actions that will hurt social welfare. In a sense, this socializes the cost
of a strategy profile. The underlying assumption is that money (taxes, tolls) and cost in
the game (e.g., delay for congestion games) can be measured on the same scale, or that
one can be converted linearly to the other at a player-specific rate ρi. Then, players will
minimize a (weighted) sum of the two types of cost. If we think of charging each player
the full social cost (possibly minus a large constant term), then our altruistic model
captures the incentives of players by setting αi = ρi.
Consider the following toll scheme, due to Pigou [1920]: For every facility e, consider
the load on e in a socially optimal solution, and set the toll on e to be the marginal cost a
player would inflict on other users of e by using e as well. It is well known [Pigou 1920]
that these tolls induce an optimal solution, in the sense that the Nash equilibrium
will minimize the social cost. Our model of partial altruism, after subtracting out
constant terms not under a player’s control, can instead be interpreted as charging
players a traffic-dependent marginal cost. Our results can thus also be interpreted
as investigating the (robust) price of anarchy when different players have different
tradeoffs between taxes and delay, and tolls are based on marginal costs. Similar
models of tolls were considered, for example, in Dafermos [1972] and Smith [1979].
Cole et al. [2003, 2006] study optimization problems arising from nonuniform taxation
in networks. (However, their goal is to minimize the total tolls, subject to forcing the
flow to be optimal.)
Another interpretation of the model suggests itself when the altruism distribution
has support {0,1}. In this case, a λ fraction of players (having αi = 1) is entirely altru-
istic, while a 1−λ fraction is entirely selfish. In the case of atomic games, we have seen
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that altruism can lead to worse price of anarchy, but in the case of nonatomic games,
we can interpret the λ fraction of altruistic players as being under the control of a
benevolent authority aiming to minimize the social cost. When the benevolent author-
ity commits to a strategy first, and the selfish players adapt subsequently, this is an
instance of a Stackelberg game (see, e.g., Roughgarden [2004]). Indeed, any equilibrium
of the game with selfish and altruistic players gives rise to a Stackelberg strategy for
the benevolent authority, such that the resulting equilibrium among selfish players
matches the equilibrium of the game with altruism.3 In particular, this means that
all the price of anarchy bounds we derive for nonatomic congestion games with altru-
ism support {0,1} imply the same bounds for Stackelberg games with a benevolent
authority.
1.4. Related Work
Much of our analysis is based on extensions of the notion of smoothness as proposed
by Roughgarden [2009] (see Section 3.2). The basic idea is to bound the sum of cost
increases of individual players switching strategies by a combination of the costs of
two states. Because these types of bounds capture local improvement dynamics, they
bound the price of anarchy not only for Nash equilibria, but also more general solution
concepts, including coarse correlated equilibria. The smoothness notion was refined
in the local smoothness framework by Roughgarden and Schoppmann [2011]. They re-
quire the types of bounds described above only for nearby states, thus obtaining tighter
bounds, albeit only for more restrictive solution concepts and convex strategy sets. Us-
ing the local smoothness framework, they obtained optimal upper bounds for atomic
splittable congestion games. Nadav and Roughgarden [2010] showed that smoothness
bounds apply all the way to a solution concept called “average coarse correlated equi-
librium,” but not beyond.
A comparison between the costs in worst-case outcomes among sets of solution con-
cepts was recently undertaken by Bradonjic et al. [2009] under the name “price of
mediation:” Specifically, for the case of symmetric singleton congestion games with
convex delay functions, they showed that the ratio between the most expensive corre-
lated equilibrium and the most expensive Nash equilibrium can grow exponentially in
the number of players.
Hayrapetyan et al. [2006] studied the impact of “collusion” in network congestion
games, where players form coalitions to minimize their collective cost. These coalitions
are assumed to be formed exogenously, that is, conceptually, each coalition is replaced
by a “super-player” that acts on behalf of its members. The authors show that collusion
in network congestion games can lead to Nash equilibria that are inferior to the ones
of the collusion-free game (in terms of social cost). They also derive bounds on the
price of anarchy caused by collusion. Note that the cooperation within each coalition
can be interpreted as a kind of “locally” altruistic behavior, that is, each player only
cares about the cost of the members of his coalition. In a sense, the setting considered
in Hayrapetyan et al. [2006] can therefore be regarded as being orthogonal to the
viewpoint that we adopt in this article: in their setting, players are assumed to be
entirely altruistic but locally attached to their coalitions. In contrast, in our setting,
players may have different levels of altruism but locality does not play a role.
Several recent studies investigate “irrational” player behavior in games; examples
include studies on malicious (or spiteful) behavior [Babaioff et al. 2009; Brandt et al.
2007; Karakostas and Viglas 2007] and unpredictable (or Byzantine) behavior [Blum
et al. 2008; Moscibroda et al. 2006; Roth 2008]. The work that is most related to our
3We do not know if the converse is true, that is, if every Stackelberg strategy gives rise to a Nash equilibrium
of the same social cost for the game with altruism support {0, 1}.
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work in this context is the one by Blum et al. [2008]. The authors consider repeated
games inwhich every player is assumed tominimize his own regret. They derive bounds
on the inefficiency, called total price of anarchy, of the resulting outcomes for certain
classes of games, including congestion games and valid utility games. The exhibited
bounds exactly match the respective price of anarchy and even continue to hold if only
some of the players minimize their regret while the others are Byzantine. The latter
result is surprising in the context of valid utility games because it means that the price
of total anarchy remains at 2, even if additional players are added to the game that
behave arbitrarily.
Our findings allow us to draw an even more dramatic conclusion. Our bounds on
the robust price of anarchy also extend to the total price of anarchy of the respective
repeated games (see Section 3.3). As a consequence, our result for valid utility games
implies that the price of total anarchywould remain at 2, even if the “Byzantine” players
were to act altruistically. That is, while the result in Blum et al. [2008] suggests that
arbitrary behavior does not harm the inefficiency of the final outcome, our result shows
that altruistic behavior does not help.
Brandt et al. [2007] focus on deriving symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of
first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions with uniform spite in the linear spite
model. Their spite model is straightforward: There is a spite parameter β ∈ [0,1], and
the perceived utility of a player is equal to (1−β) times his direct utility, and −β times
the sum of the utilities of the other players. In general, the expected revenue is shown
to be increasing with growing uniform spite. They further show that the expected
revenue in second-price auctions is higher than the expected revenue in first-price
auctions when all agents are neither completely selfish nor completely spiteful. This
says that spite is breaking the well-known revenue equivalence theorem, which states
that a large class of auctions all yield the same revenue under certain conditions. They
also prove that in the presence of spite, complete information makes equilibria for the
first-price and second-price auctions identical, and reduces the revenue in second-price
auctions (compared with the revenue in the Bayesian setting), while it increases the
revenue in first-price auctions (compared with the revenue in the Bayesian setting).
For the generalization of congestion games to congestion games with “player-specific”
cost functions (which subsume models of nonuniform altruism), Milchtaich [1996]
proved the existence of pure Nash equilibria for singleton congestion games, and
Ackermann et al. [2006] for matroid congestion games, in which the strategy space
of each player is the basis of a matroid on the set of resources.
1.5. Subsequent Work
Since the original publication of the conference version of Chen and Kempe [2008],
several other papers have studied identical or similar models of altruism applied to
different types of games. Caragiannis et al. [2010] studied a nearly identical model
of altruism in atomic congestion games. Several of our present results and models
generalize results of Caragiannis et al. [2010], and we discuss them in more detail in
the corresponding sections of this article.
If players’ altruism levels in congestion games are not uniform (a special case of
player-specific congestion games), then even the existence of pure Nash equilibria is
not obvious. Hoefer and Skopalik [2009a] established it for several subclasses of atomic
congestion games. They also show the existence of pure Nash equilibria and conver-
gence for selfish scheduling with altruistic players using a time-sharing policy, while
pure Nash equilibria may not exist under other standard coordination mechanisms
[Hoefer and Skopalik 2009b].
Milchtaich [2012] uses the concept of “stability of equilibrium” to clarify that the
real, material payoff in equilibrium for a group of altruistic players may be lower
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than for selfish or spiteful groups only when the equilibria involved are unstable. If
they are stable, the total (or equivalently, average) payoff can only increase or remain
unchanged with an increasing degree of altruism.
Elias et al. [2010] consider social awareness (a definition similar to our definition
of altruism) in the context of network design games, and show that it improves the
price of anarchy and other efficiency measures. The impact on system performance of
altruistic behavior is also considered in communication networks, in particular mobile
social and opportunistic networks [Hui et al. 2009a, 2009b].
Chen et al. [2010] study amodel of altruism similar to ours in the context of a network
vaccination game, in which each individual can decide whether or not to get vaccinated,
and trades off a vaccination cost vs. the cost he might incur later if he becomes infected
over the network. Pure Nash equilibria may not exist in this game, but Chen et al.
[2010] show that under a natural opt-out dynamic, the price of anarchy is bounded
by 1/α. Meier et al. [2008] study a similar model in which altruism is replaced by
“friendship,” meaning that individuals only care about the utility of their neighbors in
the network, not all nodes.
The idea of considering “friendship networks” (and thus nonuniform altruism across
pairs of individuals), which is pursued by Meier et al. [2008] is also present in several
other articles on “social games.” For instance, such analyses are carried out in analyzing
the price of anarchy and stability in Anshelevich et al. [2012] and Buehler et al. [2011].
As discussed in the context of the work by Brandt et al. [2007], altruism, spite
or friendship are types of “externalities” in auction design, where bidders’ perceived
utilities are partly dependent on others’ utilities. Fiat et al. [2013] study the design
of externality-resistant auctions. They use a notion called “strong truthfulness” for
preventing a decrease in performance as a result of externalities among the players.
Most recently, Anagnostopoulos et al. [2013] study a generalization of our altruism
model considering player-specific directed altruistic behavior with social context and
the price of anarchy in such altruistic extensions of games. Bilo` et al. [2013] study
similar models that can in some cases be considered generalizations or variations of
our altruism model. Their work provides bounds on the price of anarchy under these
models, for linear congestion games (among other classes of games). Moreover, Rahn
and Scha¨fer [2013] introduce so-called social contribution games, where each player’s
individual cost is equal to the cost he induces on society because of his presence. They
show that such games constitute useful abstractions of altruistic games when it comes
to the analysis of the robust price of anarchy.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we formally introduce the classes of games studied in this article and
define the solution concepts and inefficiency measures used subsequently.
Throughout this article, we define [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Vectors are denoted in bold face.
For a vector x, we write x−i for the vector with the ith coordinate removed. We extend
this notation to distributions over vectors: for a distribution ξ over vectors x, we will
write ξ−i for the projection obtained by drawing a vector x according to ξ , then removing
the ith coordinate.
2.1. Strategic Games: Definitions and Classes Studied
Let G = (N, (i)i∈N, (Ci)i∈N) be a finite strategic game, where N = [n] is the set of
players, i the strategy space of player i,  = 1 × · · · × n, and Ci :  → R the
cost function of player i, mapping every strategy profile s ∈  to the player’s direct
cost. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that every player i wants to minimize his
individual cost function Ci. We also call such games cost-minimization games. A social
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cost function C :  → R maps strategies to social costs. We require that C is sum-
bounded, that is, C(s) ≤ ∑ni=1 Ci(s) for all s ∈ .4
Payoff-maximization games G = (N, (i)i∈N, (i)i∈N) are defined similarly. Here ev-
ery player i strives to maximize his payoff function i. The social welfare function is
denoted by  :  → R.
2.1.1. Atomic Congestion Games. The bulk of this article focuses on (atomic and non-
atomic) congestion games. In an atomic congestion game G = (N, E, (i)i∈N, (de)e∈E),
there is a set E of facilities. Players’ strategies are subsets of facilities, i ⊆ 2E. Each
facility e ∈ E has an associated delay function de : N → R. For any set S ⊆ E, we write
xS(s) for the number of players using exactly S as their strategy under s. We extend
this notation to write xe(s) for the number of players using facility e as part of their
strategy, that is, xe(s) = | {i ∈ N : e ∈ si} |. When s is clear from the context, we will omit
it. Player i’s cost is
Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
de(xe(s)), (1)
and the social cost is C(s) = ∑ni=1 Ci(s).
Symmetric singleton congestion games are an important special case of congestion
games, in which i = E for every i.5 In that case, we will also sometimes call the
facilities machines, as the game can be understood as each player choosing a machine
on which to have his job processed, where the processing speed of a machine decreases
as the load increases. We refer to these games simply as singleton congestion games
below.
2.1.2. Nonatomic Congestion Games. Nonatomic congestion games are defined almost
identically to atomic congestion games, except players now constitute a continuum, so
the delay functions are defined on the nonnegative real numbers: de : R≥0 → R. In the
most general version, we only assume that each de is continuous and nondecreasing.
For most of the results on nonatomic congestion games, we will want to assume that
delay functions are semiconvex: a function de is semiconvex iff x · de(x) is a convex
function. Notice that the set of facilities E remains finite; in particular, there can only
be a finite number of player types. More specifically, each player type is characterized
by the collection of subsets S ⊆ E of facilities that would constitute a feasible solution
for the player. Thus, the player types can be associated with collections S ⊆ 2E, and
there are at most 22
|E|
types.
For each S, let rS ≥ 0 be the total rate of players with strategy set S. Then,
r = ∑S⊆2E rS is the total rate of players. Thus, a nonatomic congestion game is charac-
terized by G = (E, (rS )S⊆2E, (de)e∈E). In specifying the strategy profiles, we avoid the s
notation, since we have a continuum of players. Strategy profiles of non-atomic games
are characterized by flows: For each type S, we have a flow fS,S ≥ 0 for each set of
facilities S ∈ S, such that ∑S∈S fS,S = rS . We also call the fS,S feasible flows. Notice
that while (single-commodity or multi-commodity) network flows are examples of flows
for nonatomic congestion games, our definition extends to much more general settings.
For notational convenience, we also write fS =
∑
SS fS,S for the overall flow on a set
S, and fe =
∑
Se fS for the overall flow on facility e. Similar to the atomic case, we call
4The most “natural” special case is studying the social welfare, that is, the case when C(s) = ∑ni=1 Ci(s).
However, many of our results apply to the more general setting, and some games are most naturally modeled
in this framework.
5We sometimes identify singleton sets with their element to improve readability, and write e instead of {e}.
We will do so only when we believe that no confusion can arise, and to stress one aspect or the other of the
strategy under consideration.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 2, No. 4, Article 17, Publication date: October 2014.
Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy 17:11
a nonatomic congestion game a singleton congestion game if all players have the same
type S and S = E.
2.1.3. Cost-Sharing Games. A fair cost-sharing game G = (N, E, (i)i∈N, (ce)e∈E) is de-
fined similarly to an atomic congestion game. The difference is in the nature of the cost
functions only: for a fair cost-sharing game, the individuals’ costs are
Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
ce
xe(s)
. (2)
This captures that the cost ce of acquiring the necessary facilities is shared evenly
between all users. In particular, usage of a resource by multiple players decreases the
cost to each of them, rather than increasing it. For notational convenience, we write
U (s) = ⋃i∈N si for the set of all facilities used by at least one player. The social cost
function is then C(s) = ∑ni=1 Ci(s) = ∑e∈U (s) ce.
2.1.4. Valid Utility Games. A valid utility game [Vetta 2002] is a payoff maximization
game given by G = (N, E, (i)i∈N, (i)i∈N, V ). Again, E is a ground set of resources,
and the strategy sets i are subsets of 2E. i is the payoff function that player i wants
to maximize, and V is a submodular6 and nonnegative function on E. As before, let
U (s) = ⋃i∈N si ⊆ E be the union of all players’ strategies under s. The social welfare
function  :  → R to be maximized is (s) = V (U (s)), and thus depends only on the
union of the players’ chosen strategies, evaluated by V . The individual payoff functions
of all players i ∈ N are assumed to satisfy7 i(s) ≥ (s) − (∅, s−i) for every strategy
profile s ∈ . Intuitively, this means that the individual payoff of a player is at least
his contribution to the social welfare. Moreover, it is assumed that (s) ≥ ∑ni=1 i(s)
for every s ∈ . See Vetta [2002] for a detailed description and justification of these
assumptions.
Examples of games falling into this framework include natural game-theoretic vari-
ants of the facility location, k-median and network routing problems [Vetta 2002].
2.2. Equilibrium Concepts
The most general equilibrium concept that we will deal with in this article is the
following one.
Definition 2.1 (Coarse Equilibrium). A coarse equilibrium (or coarse correlated equi-
librium) of a game G is a probability distribution σ over  = 1 × · · · × n with the
following property: if s is a random variable with distribution σ , then for each player i,
and all s∗i ∈ i:
Es∼σ [Ci(s)] ≤ Es−i∼σ−i [Ci(s∗i , s−i)].
The set of all coarse equilibria is also known as the Hannan Set (see, e.g., Young
[1995]). It includes several other solution concepts, such as correlated equilibria, mixed
Nash equilibria and pure Nash equilibria. We briefly review these equilibrium notions.
Informally, the difference between a coarse equilibrium and a correlated equilibrium
is the following: in a coarse equilibrium, a player will play according to s when he is
informed of the distribution σ from which s is drawn. In a correlated equilibrium, a
player will play according to swhen he is informed of the distribution σ as well as the
strategy that has been drawn for him, that is, that he will play under s. More formally,
6For a finite set E, a function f : 2E → R is submodular iff f (A ∪ {e}) − f (A) ≥ f (B ∪ {e}) − f (B) for any
A ⊆ B ⊆ E, e ∈ E.
7We abuse notation and write (∅, s−i) := V (
⋃
j∈N\{i} sj ).
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this means that in a correlated equilibrium, for all s∗i ∈ i,
Es∼σ [Ci(s)] ≤ Es∼σ [Ci(s∗i , s−i)].
A mixed Nash equilibrium is a coarse equilibrium whose distribution σ is the Carte-
sian product of independent distributions σ1, . . . , σn for the players. Thus, any mixed
Nash equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium. A pure Nash equilibrium is a strat-
egy profile s such that for each player i, Ci(s) ≤ Ci(s′i, s−i) for all s′i ∈ i. A pure Nash
equilibrium is a special case of a mixed Nash equilibrium where the support of σi has
cardinality 1 for all i.
We use PNE(G), MNE(G), CE(G), and CCE(G) to denote the set of pure Nash equi-
libria, mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse equilibria of a game G,
respectively.
2.3. Inefficiency of Equilibria
The price of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] and price of stability
[Anshelevich et al. 2004] are natural ways of quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria
for classes of games:
Definition 2.2 (Price of Anarchy, Price of Stability). Let S ⊆  be a set of strategy
profiles for a cost-minimization game G with social cost function C, and let s∗ be a
strategy profile that minimizes C. We define
PoA(S, G) = sup
s∈S
C(s)
C(s∗)
and PoS(S, G) = inf
s∈S
C(s)
C(s∗)
.
The coarse (respectively, correlated, mixed, pure) price of anarchy of a class of games G
is defined as
sup
G∈G
PoA(SG, G), (3)
where SG = CCE(G) (respectively, CE(G), MNE(G), PNE(G)). The coarse (respectively,
correlated, mixed, pure) price of stability of a class of games is defined analogously, that
is, by replacing PoA by PoS in Eq. (3).
We extend Definition 2.2 in the obvious way to payoff-maximization games G with
social welfare function  by considering the ratio (s∗)/(s), where s∗ refers to a
strategy profile maximizing .
3. ALTRUISM MODEL AND SMOOTHNESS TECHNIQUE
We first introduce our altruism model and show how the smoothness approach of
Roughgarden [2009] can be extended to altruistic games.
3.1. Altruistic Extensions
We study altruistic extensions of strategic games equipped with sum-bounded social
cost functions. Our definition is based on a suggestion first put forward by Ledyard
[1997] (to the best of our knowledge). We first define the altruistic extension for finite
games, and then extend it to games with a continuum of players; the latter extension,
however, is only defined for nonatomic congestion games.
3.1.1. Finite Games. We define altruistic extensions of finite games as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Altruistic extension of atomic games). Let G = (N, (i)i∈N, (Ci)i∈N)
be a finite cost-minimization game with a sum-bounded social cost function C. Let
α ∈ [0,1]n. The α-altruistic extension of G (or simply α-altruistic game) is defined as
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the strategic game Gα = (N, (i)i∈N, (Cαi )i∈N), where for every i ∈ N and s ∈ ,
Cαi (s) = (1 − αi)Ci(s) + αiC(s). (4)
Thus, the perceived cost Cαi (s) that player i experiences under s is a convex combi-
nation of his direct (selfish) cost Ci(s) and the social cost C(s); we call such a player
αi-altruistic.8 When αi = 0, player i is entirely selfish; thus, α = 0 recovers the original
game. A player with αi = 1 is entirely altruistic. Given an altruism vector α ∈ [0,1]n,
we let αˆ = maxi∈N αi and αˇ = mini∈N αi denote the maximum and minimum altruism
levels, respectively. When αi = α (a scalar) for all i, we call such games uniformly
α-altruistic games.
Remark 3.2. In a recent paper, Caragiannis et al. [2010] model uniformly altruistic
players by defining the perceived cost of player i as (1− ξ )Ci(s)+ ξ (C(s)− Ci(s)), where
ξ ∈ [0,1]. It is not hard to see that in the range ξ ∈ [0, 12 ] this definition is equivalent
to ours by setting α = ξ/(1 − ξ ) or ξ = α/(1 + α).9
The altruistic extension of a payoff-maximization game, in which players seek to
maximize their payoff functions (i)i∈N, with a social welfare function  is defined
analogously to Definition 3.1; the only difference is that every player i wants to maxi-
mize αi instead of minimizing C
α
i here.
3.1.2. Nonatomic Congestion Games. To motivate the definition of the altruistic exten-
sion of nonatomic congestion games, we consider them as the limit of finite congestion
games as the number of players grows to infinity. If we increase the number of players
while keeping the “scale” of the delay functions constant, the delay on the (finitely
many) facilities will grow to infinity, so in the limit, the comparison of strategies will
be meaningless. Probably the most natural way to circumvent this issue is to keep the
total “rate” of players constant, and make the impact of each individual player smaller
as the number of players grows.
Specifically, fix a total rate rS for each possible player type S ⊆ 2E, and let r =∑
S⊆2E rS be the total rate of players. The delay functions of the non-atomic game are
de : [0, r] → R. When we consider an atomic game with N players, we will consider
having NS = N · rSr players of type S, and define the cost functions De(k) := de(rk/N).
(Here, and subsequently, we will treat NS and similar large numbers as integers, and
omit ceiling/floor operators.) Consider a strategy profile in which a player with altruism
α plays the strategy S ⊆ E; for each e ∈ E, as before, let xe be the number of players
whose strategy includes the facility e. Equation (4) for this player’s perceived cost then
becomes
Cα(s) = (1 − α)
∑
e∈S
De(xe) + α
∑
e∈E
xe De(xe).
Define x′e = xe −1 for e ∈ S, and x′e = xe for e /∈ S to be the total load on each resource
when the player is not participating at all. Thus, x′ is independent of the strategy
chosen by this player, and minimizing Cα(s) is equivalent to minimizing
Cα(s) − α
∑
e∈E
x′e De(x
′
e) = (1 − α)
∑
e∈S
De(xe) + α
∑
e∈S
(xe De(xe) − (xe − 1)De(xe − 1)).
8We note that the altruistic part of an individual’s perceived cost does not recursively take other players’
perceived cost into account. Such recursive definitions of altruistic utility have been studied, for example, by
Bergstrom [1999], and can be reduced to our definition under suitable technical conditions.
9The model of Caragiannis et al. [2010] with ξ ∈ ( 12 , 1] has players assign strictly more weight to others than
to themselves, a possibility not present in our model.
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We express the number of players on a facility e in terms of the flow on the facility
as follows: xe = Nfe/r. We substitute this definition as well as the definition of De, and
then write δ = r/N, to obtain that the player minimizes
(1 − α)
∑
e∈S
de( fe) + α
∑
e∈S
( fede( fe) − ( fe − r/N)de( fe − r/N))
r/N
= (1 − α)
∑
e∈S
de( fe) + α
∑
e∈S
( fede( fe) − ( fe − δ)de( fe − δ))
δ
.
Keeping the total rate r of players fixed, and letting N → ∞ results in δ → 0, which
means that the expression that the player minimizes converges to
(1 − α)
∑
e∈S
de( fe) + α
∑
e∈S
( fede( fe))′
This derivation motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.3. In an altruistic extension of a nonatomic congestion game, each α-
altruistic player of type S with α ∈ [0,1] chooses a subset S ∈ S so as to minimize the
cost function
d(α)S ( f ) := (1 − α)
∑
e∈S
de( fe) + α
∑
e∈S
( fede( fe))′.
The expression ( fede( fe))′ denotes the derivative with respect to fe. Notice that we can
rewrite d(α)S ( f ) =
∑
e∈S de( fe) + α
∑
e∈S fed
′
e( fe).
While our definition is motivated mathematically, there is a “psychological” interpre-
tation of the underlying choice: in order to behave (partially) altruistically, infinitesi-
mally small players must give infinitesimally small weight to their own cost or payoff,
which is achieved implicitly by making the altruistic component the derivative of the
social welfare. When there are infinitely many infinitesimally small players, then no
individual’s actions will have an impact on the overall welfare. This kind of reasoning
can be observed in the real world when individuals refuse to take the “right” action on
the grounds that their actions “don’t matter” (e.g., “It does not affect pollution whether
I personally drive to work”). Altruistic behavior is more likely to arise when individuals
project their actions on the population as a whole (“What would happen if everyone
acted the way I do?”), which is mathematically accomplished by considering the rate of
change of the welfare.
Based on Definition 3.3, we would like to define the altruistic extension of a game
with possibly different altruism levels for different players. In the most general case,
for each possible player type S, we are given an arbitrary altruism density function ψS
on the interval [0,1]. We only require that all these functions ψS be indeed distribu-
tions, that is, forming a Borel measure of total measure 1. If the rate for type S is rS ,
then the overall altruism density function is ψ = 1r
∑
S rSψS . The average altruism of a
distribution ψ is then
∫ 1
0 tψ(t)dt. An instance of the altruistic extension of a non-atomic
congestion game is thus the quadruple (E, r, d, (ψS )S⊆2E). In symmetric nonatomic con-
gestion games, in which all players are of the same type S ⊆ 2E, we write (E, r, d, ψ),
and if the altruism is uniform (i.e., the distribution deterministically takes the value
α), we simplify further to (E, r, d, α).
3.2. Inefficiency of Altruistic Games and Smoothness
Many proofs bounding the price of anarchy for specific games (e.g., Roughgarden [2005]
and Vetta [2002]) use the fact that deviating from an equilibrium to the strategy at
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optimum is not beneficial for any player. The addition of these inequalities, combined
with suitable properties of the social cost function, then gives a bound on the equilib-
rium’s cost. Roughgarden [2009] captured the essence of this type of argument with his
definition of (λ,μ)-smoothness of a game, thus providing a generic template for proving
bounds on the price of anarchy. Indeed, because such arguments only reason about
local moves by players, they immediately imply bounds not only for Nash equilibria,
but all classes of equilibria defined in Section 2.2, as well as the outcomes of no-regret
sequences of play [Blum et al. 2006, 2008]. Recent work has explored both the limits of
this concept [Nadav and Roughgarden 2010] and a refinement requiring smoothness
only in local neighborhoods [Roughgarden and Schoppmann 2011]. The latter permits
more fine-grained analysis of games, but applies only to correlated equilibria and their
subclasses.
In this article, we study the price of anarchy and the price of stability of altruistic
extensions Gα with respect to the original social cost function C, not accounting for the
altruistic components. This reflects our desire to understand the overall performance
of the system (or strategic game), which is not affected by different perceptions of
costs by individuals. Note, however, that if all players have a uniform altruism level
αi = α ∈ [0,1] and the social cost function C is equal to the sum of all players’ individual
costs, then for every strategy profile s ∈ , Cα(s) = (1 − α + αn)C(s), where Cα(s) =∑
i∈N C
α
i (s) denotes the sum of all players’ perceived costs. In particular, bounding the
price of anarchy with respect to C is equivalent to bounding the price of anarchy with
respect to total perceived cost Cα in this case.
In extending the definition of smoothness to altruistic games, we have to exercise
some care. Simply applying Roughgarden’s definition to the new game does not work,
as the social cost function we wish to bound is the sum of all direct costs without
consideration of the altruistic component. Thus, with respect to the social cost, altruistic
games are in general not sum-bounded. For this reason, we propose a slightly revised
definition of (λ,μ,α)-smoothness.
For notational convenience, we define C−i(s) = C(s) − Ci(s) ≤
∑
j =i C j(s). Note that
when the social cost is the sum of all players’ costs, the inequality is an equality.
Definition 3.4 ((λ,μ,α)-smoothness). Let Gα be an α-altruistic extension of a game
with sum-bounded social cost function C. Gα is (λ,μ,α)-smooth if for any two strategy
profiles s, s′ ∈ ,
n∑
i=1
Ci(s′i, s−i) + αi(C−i(s′i, s−i) − C−i(s)) ≤ λC(s′) + μC(s). (5)
We also define the notion of smoothness for non-atomic games. To avoid notational
overload, we only define it for the case of uniform altruism α; we only use it in this case
here. For a nonatomic game Gα = (E, r, d, α), we say that Gα is (λ,μ, α)-smooth if for
any two feasible flows f and f ′,∑
e∈E
( f ′ede( fe) + ( f ′e − fe)α fed′e( fe)) ≤ λC( f ′) + μC( f ). (6)
For α = 0, this definition coincides with Roughgarden’s notion of (λ,μ)-smoothness,
and indeed, we recover Roughgarden’s smoothness result as a special case of Proposi-
tion 3.5. To gain some intuition, consider two strategy profiles s, s′ ∈ , and a player
i ∈ N who switches from his strategy si under s to s′i, while the strategies of the other
players remain fixed at s−i. The contribution of player i to the left-hand side of (5) then
accounts for the individual cost that player i perceives after the switch, plus αi times
the difference in social cost caused by this switch excluding player i. The sum of these
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contributions needs to be bounded by λC(s′)+ μC(s). We will see that this definition of
(λ,μ,α)-smoothness allows us to quantify the price of anarchy of some large classes of
altruistic games with respect to the very broad class of coarse correlated equilibria.
The definition of smoothness can be naturally extended to payoff maximization
games. Let Gα be an α-altruistic extension of a payoff maximization game with so-
cial welfare function . Define −i(s) = (s)−i(s). Gα is (λ,μ,α)-smooth iff for every
two strategy profiles s, s′ ∈ ,
n∑
i=1
i(s′i, s−i) + αi(−i(s′i, s−i) − −i(s)) ≥ λ(s′) − μ(s). (7)
3.3. Robust Price of Anarchy
As a useful tool for our subsequent analysis, we first show that many of the results in
Roughgarden [2009] following from (λ,μ)-smoothness carry over to our altruistic set-
ting using the extended (λ,μ,α)-smoothness notion (Definition 3.4). Even though some
care has to be taken in extending these results, most of the proofs of the propositions in
this section follow along similar lines as their analogues in Roughgarden [2009]. The
proofs are in Appendix A.
PROPOSITION 3.5. Let Gα be an α-altruistic extension of a game with sum-bounded
social cost function C. If Gα is (λ,μ,α)-smooth with μ < 1, then the coarse (and thus
correlated, mixed, and pure) price of anarchy of Gα is at most λ1−μ .
For α = 0, we recover Roughgarden’s smoothness result as a special case. Proposi-
tion 3.5 can be naturally extended to smooth nonatomic congestion games with uniform
altruism.
PROPOSITION 3.6. Let Gα be a uniformly α-altruistic nonatomic congestion game. If Gα
is (λ,μ, α)-smooth with μ < 1, then the coarse price of anarchy of Gα is at most λ1−μ .
As we show later, for many important classes of games, the bounds obtained by
(λ,μ,α)-smoothness arguments are actually tight, even for pure Nash equilibria.
Therefore, as in Roughgarden [2009], we define the robust price of anarchy as the
best possible bound on the coarse price of anarchy obtainable by a (λ,μ,α)-smoothness
argument.
Definition 3.7. The robust price of anarchy of an α-altruistic game Gα is defined as
RPoAG(α) = inf
{
λ
1 − μ : G
α is (λ,μ,α)-smooth, μ < 1
}
.
For a class G of games, we define RPoAG(α) = supG∈G RPoAG(α). We omit the subscript
when the game (or class of games) is clear from the context.
The definition extends naturally to nonatomic congestion games; we will only con-
sider such games with uniform altruism α.
The smoothness condition also proves useful in the context of no-regret sequences
and the price of total anarchy, introduced by Blum et al. [2008].
PROPOSITION 3.8. Let Gα be an α-altruistic extension of a game with sum-bounded
social cost function C. Let s∗ be a strategy profile minimizing the social cost function C
of Gα, and let s1, . . . , sT be a sequence of strategy profiles in which every player i ∈ N
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experiences vanishing average external regret, that is,
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
t) ≤
(
min
s′i∈i
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
′
i, s
t
−i)
)
+ o(T ). (8)
The average cost of this sequence of T strategy profiles then satisfies
1
T
T∑
t=1
C(st) ≤ RPoA(α) · C(s∗) as T → ∞.
Proposition 3.8 extends to the case of nonatomic congestion games. In order to state
the conditions and proof precisely, we use the following notation. Let τ : [0, r] →
{S : S is a type of player} be any (fixed) map with the property that |τ−1(S)| = rS for all
types S. In other words, we associate the continuum of players with the interval [0, r]
and associate with each point y the type of the particular player. Then, we consider a
valid flow f as a mapping φ : [0, r] → {S ∈ 2E} with the property that φ(y) ∈ τ (y); in
other words, we assign a strategy to each among the continuum of players.10
PROPOSITION 3.9. Consider a uniformly α-altruistic nonatomic congestion game Gα
that is (λ,μ, α)-smooth with μ < 1. Let f ∗ be a flow minimizing the social cost C, and
f 1, . . . , f T a sequence of flows in which every infinitesimal player y ∈ [0, r] experiences
vanishing average external regret in the following sense:
T∑
t=1
∑
e∈φt(y)
de
(
f te
)+ α f te d′e( f te ) ≤ min
Sˆ∈τ (y)
T∑
t=1
∑
e∈Sˆ
(
de
(
f te
)+ α f te d′e( f te ))+ o(T ).
The average cost of this sequence of T flows then satisfies
1
T
T∑
t=1
C( f t) ≤ RPoA(α) · C( f ∗) + o(1)
as T → ∞.
The results in this section continue to hold for altruistic extensions of payoff-
maximization games using the modified definition according to (7). Given this smooth-
ness definition, all these results hold when we replace λ1−μ by
1+μ
λ
and μ < 1 by μ > −1
in Definition 3.7.
4. ATOMIC CONGESTION GAMES
We begin by studying atomic linear congestion games. Atomic congestion games were
defined in Section 2.1.1; linear congestion games are the special case in which the delay
functions are of the form de(x) = aex + be, where ae, be are non-negative rational num-
bers. Pure Nash equilibria of altruistic extensions of linear congestion games always
exist [Hoefer and Skopalik 2009a]; this may not be the case for arbitrary (nonlinear)
congestion games.
The price of anarchy of linear congestion games (without altruism) is known to be
5
2 [Christodoulou and Koutsoupias 2005]. Recently, Caragiannis et al. [2010] extended
this result to linear congestion games with uniformly altruistic players. Applying the
transformation outlined in Remark 3.2, their result can be stated as follows:
10This assignment is of course not unique, and we choose one arbitrarily.
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THEOREM 4.1 (CARAGIANNIS ET AL. [2010]). The pure price of anarchy of uniformly α-
altruistic linear congestion games is at most 5+4α2+α .
The proof in Caragiannis et al. [2010] implicitly uses a smoothness argument in the
framework we define here for altruistic games. Thus, without any additional work,
our framework allows the extension of Theorem 4.1 to the robust PoA. Caragiannis
et al. [2010] also showed that the bound of Theorem 4.1 is asymptotically tight, based
on singleton examples. A somewhat simpler nonsingleton example (given here) proves
tightness of this bound (not only asymptotically). Thus, the robust price of anarchy is
exactly 5+4α2+α . We give a refinement of Theorem 4.1 to non-uniform altruism distribu-
tions, obtaining a bound in terms of the maximum and minimum altruism levels.
THEOREM 4.2. The robust price of anarchy of α-altruistic linear congestion games is
at most 5+2αˆ+2αˇ2−αˆ+2αˇ .
As a first step in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we show that, without loss of generality, we
can focus on simpler instances of linear congestion games. The proof is in Appendix B.
LEMMA 4.3. Without loss of generality, all delay functions are of the form de(x) = x.
The next step in the proof of Theorem 4.2 is the following technical lemma:
LEMMA 4.4. For every two nonnegative integers x, y and αˆ, αˇ ∈ [0,1] with αˆ ≥ αˇ,
((1 + αˆ)x + 1)y + αˇ(1 − x)x ≤ 5 + 2αˆ + 2αˇ
3
y2 + 1 + αˆ − 2αˇ
3
x2.
To prove this lemma, we make use of the following result whose proof is also in
Appendix B:
LEMMA 4.5. For all x, y ∈ N0, η ∈ [0,1] and β ∈ [0,1], and all γ ∈ [ 13 (1+η−2βη),1+η],
((1 + η)x + 1)y + βη(1 − x)x ≤ (2 + η − γ )y2 + γ x2.
Now we can complete the proof of Lemma 4.4.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.4. Let β = αˇ
αˆ
∈ [0,1]. Using Lemma 4.5, we obtain
((1 + αˆ)x + 1)y + αˇ(1 − x)x = ((1 + αˆ)x + 1)y + βαˆ(1 − x)x ≤ (2 + αˆ − γ )y2 + γ x2,
for any γ ∈ [ 13 (1 + αˆ − 2βαˆ),1 + αˆ]. By choosing γ = 13 (1 + αˆ − 2βαˆ), we obtain that
((1 + αˆ)x + 1)y + αˇ(1 − x)x ≤ 5 + 2αˆ + 2βαˆ
3
y2 + 1 + αˆ − 2βαˆ
3
x2.
Substituting βαˆ = αˇ yields the claim.
We remark that the choice of γ in the proof has been made in order to minimize the
expression λ/(1 − μ) (which is an increasing function in γ ).
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2. We show that the α-altruistic extension Gα of a linear con-
gestion game is ( 13 (5 + 2αˆ + 2αˇ), 13 (1 + αˆ − 2αˇ),α)-smooth.
Let s and s′ be two strategy profiles, and write xe = xe(s), x′e = xe(s′). Using that
C−i(s) = C(s) − Ci(s) by definition, the left-hand side of the smoothness condition (5)
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can be rewritten as
n∑
i=1
((1 − αi)Ci(s′i, s−i) + αi(C(s′i, s−i) − C(s)) + αiCi(s))
=
n∑
i=1
⎛
⎝(1 − αi)
⎛
⎝ ∑
e∈s′i\si
(xe + 1) +
∑
e∈si∩s′i
xe
⎞
⎠
+ αi
⎛
⎝ ∑
e∈s′i\si
(2xe + 1) +
∑
e∈si\s′i
(1 − 2xe)
⎞
⎠+ αiCi(s)
⎞
⎠
=
n∑
i=1
⎛
⎝ ∑
e∈s′i\si
((1 + αi)xe + 1) + (1 − αi)
∑
e∈si∩s′i
xe + αi
∑
e∈si\s′i
(1 − 2xe) + αi
∑
e∈si
xe
⎞
⎠
≤
n∑
i=1
⎛
⎝∑
e∈s′i
((1 + αi)xe + 1) + αi
∑
e∈si
(1 − 2xe) + αi
∑
e∈si
xe
⎞
⎠
=
n∑
i=1
⎛
⎝∑
e∈s′i
((1 + αi)xe + 1) + αi
∑
e∈si
(1 − xe)
⎞
⎠
≤
∑
e∈E
(((1 + αˆ)xe + 1)x′e + αˇ(1 − xe)xe).
In this derivation, the first inequality follows from the fact that (1−αi)xe ≤ (1+αi)xe +
1 + αi(1 − 2xe) for every e ∈ si ∩ s′i. The second inequality holds because 1 − xe ≤ 0 for
every i ∈ N and e ∈ si, and by the definition of αˆ and αˇ. The bound on the robust price
of anarchy now follows from Lemma 4.4.
The following is a simple example that shows that the bound of 5+4α2+α on the robust
price of anarchy for uniformly α-altruistic linear congestion games is tight, even for
pureNash equilibria. It slightly improves the lower bound example of Caragiannis et al.
[2010], because it is simpler and it shows tightness of the bound not only asymptotically.
Example 4.6. Consider a gamewith six resources E = E1∪E2, E1 = {h0, h1, h2} , E2 =
{g0, g1, g2} and three α-altruistic players. The delay functions are de(x) = (1 + α)x for
e ∈ E1, and de(x) = x for e ∈ E2. Each player i has two pure strategies: {hi−1, gi−1}
and {h(i−2) (mod 3), hi (mod 3), gi (mod 3)}. The strategy profile in which every player selects
his first strategy is a social optimum of cost (1 + α) · 3 + 3 = (2 + α) · 3.
Consider the strategy profile s in which every player chooses his second strategy.
We argue that s is a Nash equilibrium. Each player’s perceived individual cost is
c1 = (1− α)(4(1+ α)+ 1)+ α(5+ 4α) · 3, whereas if a player unilaterally deviates to his
first strategy, the new social cost would become 11α+16 = (5+4α) ·3+1−α. Thus, the
player’s new perceived individual cost is c2 = (1−α)(3(1+α)+2)+α((5+4α) ·3+1−α).
Because c1 = c2, s is a Nash equilibrium, of cost 4(1+α) ·3+3 = (5+4α) ·3. We conclude
that the pure price of anarchy is at least 5+4α2+α for α ∈ [0,1].
We turn to the pure price of stability of α-altruistic congestion games. Notice that an
upper bound on the pure price of stability extends to the mixed, correlated and coarse
price of stability.
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PROPOSITION 4.7. The pure price of stability of uniformly α-altruistic linear congestion
games is at most 21+α .
PROOF. The proof exploits a standard technique to bound the pure price of stability of
exact potential games (see, e.g., Anshelevich et al. [2004] andNisan et al. [2007]). Let Gα
be a uniformly α-altruistic extension of a linear congestion game. It is not hard to verify
that Gα is an exact potential game with potential function α(s) = (1− α)(s)+ αC(s),
where (s) = ∑e∈E∑xe(s)i=1 i is Rosenthal’s potential function [Rosenthal 1973]. Observe
that for any strategy profile s,
α(s) = (1 − α)
∑
e∈E
xe(s)∑
i=1
i + αC(s)
= 1 − α
2
∑
e∈E
(
f 2e (s) + xe(s)
)+ α∑
e∈E
x2e (s) =
1 + α
2
C(s) + 1 − α
2
∑
e∈E
xe(s).
We therefore have 1+α2 C(s) ≤ α(s) ≤ C(s). Now, let s∗ be an optimal profile, minimizing
C(s∗), and s a Nash equilibrium profile, minimizing α(s). Then, C(s) ≤ 21+αα(s) ≤
2
1+α
α(s∗) ≤ 21+α C(s∗), completing the proof.
5. ATOMIC SYMMETRIC SINGLETON CONGESTION GAMES
As defined in Section 2.1.1, symmetric singleton congestion games are the special case
of congestion games in which i = E for all players, that is, every strategy consists
of a single resource, and each player has the same strategy space. In singleton linear
congestion games, the focus here, delay functions are also assumed to be linear, that is,
of the form de(x) = aex + be.
5.1. Lower Bounds
Caragiannis et al. [2010] prove the following theorem (stated using the transformation
from Remark 3.2). It shows that the pure price of anarchy does not always increase
with the altruism level; the relationship between α and the price of anarchy is thus
rather subtle.
THEOREM 5.1 (CARAGIANNIS ET AL. [2010]). The pure price of anarchy of uniformly α-
altruistic singleton linear congestion games is 43+α .
We show that even the mixed price of anarchy (and thus also the robust price of an-
archy) will be at least 2 regardless of the altruism levels of the players, by generalizing
a result of Lu¨cking et al. [2008, Theorem 5.4]. This implies that the benefits of higher
altruism in singleton congestion games are only reaped in pure Nash equilibria, and
the gap between the pure and mixed price of anarchy increases in α. Also, it shows
that singleton congestion games constitute a class of games for which the smoothness
argument cannot deliver tight bounds.
PROPOSITION 5.2. For every α ∈ [0,1]n, the mixed price of anarchy for α-altruistic
singleton linear congestion games is at least 2.
PROOF. Let m ≥ 2, and consider the instance with player set {1, . . . , m} and facility set
{1, . . . , m}, with de(x) = x for each facility e. Denote by σ the mixed strategy in which
each player chooses each facility with probability 1/m. When αi = 0 for every player,
σ is a mixed Nash equilibrium, and Es∼σ [C(s)] = 2m− 1, as proved in Lu¨cking et al.
[2008]. The optimum is clearly m, so the price of anarchy of this instance is 2 − 1/m.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 2, No. 4, Article 17, Publication date: October 2014.
Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy 17:21
All that is left to show is that σ is also a Nash equilibrium under arbitrary altruism
levels. By symmetry, it suffices to show that the expected perceived cost of player 1
increases if he deviates to the strategy where he chooses facility 1 with probability
1. In the following derivation, all expectations are taken over s ∼ σ . By linearity of
expectation,
E
[
Cα1 (1, s−1)
] = (1 − α1)E[C1(1, s−1)] + α1E[C(1, s−1)].
We already know that E[C1(1, s−1)] ≥ E[C1(s)], because σ is a Nash equilibrium when
the players are completely selfish, so it only remains to show that E[C(1, s−1)] ≥
E[C(s)] = 2m− 1.
For an arbitrary pure strategy profile s′, let Xi,e(s′) be the indicator function thatmaps
to 1 if player i chooses facility e under s′, and 0 otherwise. Then, Ci(s′) =
∑
e Xi,e(s
′)de(s′)
for i = 1, . . . , m, with de(s′) =
∑
i Xi,e(s
′) for e = 1, . . . , m. So Ci(s′) =
∑
e, j Xi,e(s
′)Xj,e(s′).
Using this last identity, along with symmetry, independence, and linearity of expecta-
tion, we obtain the following derivation (letting s′ = (1, s−1)):
E[C(s′)] =
m∑
i=1
E[Ci(s′)] = E[C1(s′)] + (m− 1)E[C2(s′)]
= E[d1(s′)] + (m− 1)
m∑
e, j=1
E[X2,e(s′)Xj,e(s′)]
=
m∑
i=1
E
[
Xi,1(s′)
]+ (m− 1)
⎛
⎝ m∑
j=1
E[X2,1(s′)Xj,1(s′)]
⎞
⎠
+ (m− 1)
⎛
⎝ m∑
j=1
E[X2,2(s′)Xj,2(s′)]
⎞
⎠
=
(
1 + (m− 1) 1
m
)
+ (m− 1)
(
1
m
+ 1
m
+ (m− 2) 1
m2
+ (m− 1)
(
1
m
+ (m− 2) 1
m2
))
= 2m− 1.
5.2. Upper Bounds
As a first step in the long-term goal to extend upper bounds to arbitrary non-uniform
altruism distributions, we analyze the case when all altruism levels are in {0,1}, that
is, each player is either completely altruistic or completely selfish. Then, the altruism
distribution is entirely characterized by the fraction of altruistic players (which coin-
cides with the average altruism level α¯). The next theorem shows that in this case, too,
the pure price of anarchy improves with the overall altruism level.
THEOREM 5.3. Assume that an α¯ fraction of the players are completely altruistic, and
the remaining (1 − α¯) fraction are completely selfish. Then, the pure price of anarchy of
the altruistic singleton linear congestion game is at most 4−2α¯3−α¯ .
Before proving Theorem 5.3, we note that the theorem implies that for linear sin-
gleton congestion games, entirely altruistic players will ensure that Nash equilibria
are optimal. In fact, Lemma 5.5 implies that Nash equilibria reached by entirely al-
truistic players are optimal for singleton congestion games if the delay functions are
semiconvex. We summarize this result in the following corollary.
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COROLLARY 5.4. The pure price of anarchy of 1-altruistic extensions of singleton con-
gestion games with semiconvex delay functions is 1.
We begin with a high-level outline of the proof of Theorem 5.3. Let s be a pure Nash
equilibrium of Gα, and s∗ an optimal strategy profile. Again, we write xe = xe(s) and
x∗e = xe(s∗). Based on the strategy profile s, we partition the facilities in E into two sets
E0 and E1:
E1 = {e ∈ E : ∃i ∈ N with αi = 1 and si = {e}},
E0 = E\E1.
That is, E1 is the set of facilities having at least one altruistic player, while E0 is
the set of facilities that are used exclusively by selfish players or not used at all.
Let N1 and N0 refer to the respective player sets that are using E1 and E0. N1 may
contain both altruistic and selfish players, while N0 consists of selfish players only. Let
n1 = |N1| =
∑
e∈E1 xe and n0 = |N0| = n−n1 denote the number of players in N1 and N0,
respectively.
The high-level approach of our proof is as follows: We split the total cost C(s) of the
pure Nash equilibrium into C(s) = γC(s) + (1 − γ )C(s) for some γ ∈ [0,1] such that
γC(s) = ∑e∈E0 xede(xe) and (1 − γ )C(s) = ∑e∈E1 xede(xe). We bound these two contribu-
tions separately to show that
3
4
γC(s) + (1 − γ )C(s) ≤ C(s∗). (9)
The pure price of anarchy is therefore at most ( 34γ + (1 − γ ))−1 = 44−γ . The bound then
follows by deriving an upper bound on γ in Lemma 5.7.
Our first lemma shows that in a sense, altruistic players “emulate” the social op-
timum. While we will only need the lemma for linear cost functions, it holds more
generally for semi-convex functions, so we state and prove it in this generality.
LEMMA 5.5. Assume that all cost functions (de)e∈E are semi-convex. Let s be a pure
Nash equilibrium. Then, there is an optimal strategy profile s∗ such that xe(s) ≤ xe(s∗)
for every facility e ∈ E1.
PROOF. Assume that x∗e < xe for some e ∈ E1. Then, there is some facility e′ ∈ E with
x∗e′ > xe′ . Consider an altruistic player i ∈ N1 with si = {e}. (Note that i must exist by
the definition of E1.) Because s is a pure Nash equilibrium, i has no incentive to deviate
from e to e′, that is, C({e′}, s−i) ≥ C(s), or, equivalently,
(xe′ + 1)de′ (xe′ + 1) − xe′de′ (xe′ ) ≥ xede(xe) − (xe − 1)de(xe − 1). (10)
Since x∗e ≤ xe −1 and xe′ ≤ x∗e′ −1, the semiconvexity of the delay functions implies that
(x∗e + 1)de(x∗e + 1) − x∗e de(x∗e ) ≤ xede(xe) − (xe − 1)de(xe − 1), (11)
(xe′ + 1)de′ (xe′ + 1) − xe′de′ (xe′ ) ≤ x∗e′de′ (x∗e′ ) − (x∗e′ − 1)de′ (x∗e′ − 1). (12)
By combining Inequalities (10), (11), and (12) and rearranging terms, we obtain that
(x∗e + 1)de(x∗e + 1) + (x∗e′ − 1)de′ (x∗e′ − 1) ≤ x∗e de(x∗e ) + x∗e′de′ (x∗e′ ).
This inequality implies that by moving a player j with s∗j =
{
e′
}
from e′ to e, we obtain a
new strategy profile s′ = ({e} , s∗− j) of cost C(s′) ≤ C(s∗). (Note that j must exist because
x∗e′ > xe′ ≥ 0.) Moreover, the number of players using facility e under the new strategy
profile s′ increased by one. We can repeat the above argument (with s′ in place of s∗)
until we obtain an optimal strategy profile that satisfies the claim of the lemma.
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Henceforth, we assume, without loss of generality, that s∗ is an optimal strategy
profile satisfying the statement of Lemma 5.5. Next, we bound the cost that the Nash
equilibrium incurs on the facilities that are not exclusively used by altruistic players.
LEMMA 5.6. Define y∗ as y∗e = x∗e −xe ≥ 0 for every e ∈ E1, and y∗e = x∗e for every facility
e ∈ E0. Then,
∑
e∈E0 xede(xe) ≤ 43
∑
e∈E y
∗
e de(x
∗
e ).
PROOF. Consider the game G¯ induced by Gα if all n1 players in N1 are fixed on the
facilities in E1 according to s. Note that all remaining n0 = n − n1 players in N0 are
selfish. That is, G¯ is a symmetric singleton congestion game with player set N0, facility
set E and delay functions (d¯e)e∈E, where d¯e(z) = de(xe + z) if e ∈ E1 and d¯e(z) = de(z) for
e ∈ E0. Let s¯ be the restriction of s to the players in N0, and define x¯ to be the induced
flows: that is, x¯e = 0 for e ∈ E1 and x¯e = xe for e ∈ E0.
s¯ is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game G¯, because each of the selfish players in
N0 faces exactly the same situation in G¯ under s¯ as in Gα under s. Let s¯∗ be a socially
optimum profile for G¯; for each facility e, let x¯∗e be the total number of players on e
under s¯∗. Then,∑
e∈E0
xede(xe) =
∑
e∈E
x¯ed¯e(x¯e) ≤ 43
∑
e∈E
x¯∗e d¯e(x¯
∗
e ) ≤
4
3
∑
e∈E
y∗e d¯e(y
∗
e ) =
4
3
∑
e∈E
y∗e de(x
∗
e ).
The first inequality follows from Theorem 5.1, and the second inequality follows from
the optimality of s¯∗.
LEMMA 5.7. γ is bounded by γ ≤ 2n0n+n0 ≤ 2(1−α¯)2−α¯ .
PROOF. The claim follows directly from Theorem 5.1 if N1 = ∅, and it holds trivially
whenever N0 = ∅ by definition of γ . So assume that N0 = ∅, N1 = ∅, and let j ∈ N1
be arbitrary with sj = {e′}, e′ ∈ E1. Let C¯(s) =
∑
i∈N0 Ci(s)/n0 be the average cost
experienced by the (selfish) players in N0. We first show Cj(s) ≥ 12 C¯(s). Let i ∈ N0 be
arbitrary, si = {e} , e ∈ E0. Because s is a Nash equilibrium, and i does not want to
deviate to facility e′,
Ci(s) = aexe + be ≤ ae′ (xe′ + 1) + be′ ≤ 2(ae′ xe′ + be′ ) = 2Cj(s).
By summing over all n0 selfish players in N0, we obtain that Cj(s) ≥ 12 C¯(s), and thus∑
j∈N1 Cj(s) ≥ 12n1C¯(s). By definition of γ ,
γ =
∑
i∈N0 Ci(s)∑
i∈N0 Ci(s) +
∑
j∈N1 Cj(s)
≤ n0C¯(s)
n0C¯(s) + 12n1C¯(s)
= 2n0
n+ n0 ≤
2(1 − α¯)
2 − α¯ ,
where the last inequality follows because n0 ≤ (1 − α¯)n.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3. Using these lemmas, and the definition of y∗e fromLemma5.6,
we can prove Inequality (9):
3
4
γC(s) + (1 − γ )C(s) = 3
4
∑
e∈E0
xede(xe) +
∑
e∈E1
xede(xe) ≤
∑
e∈E
y∗e de(x
∗
e ) +
∑
e∈E1
xede(xe)
=
∑
e∈E
x∗e de(x
∗
e ) +
∑
e∈E1
(xede(xe) − xede(x∗e )) ≤
∑
e∈E
x∗e de(x
∗
e ) = C(s∗).
The first inequality follows from Lemma 5.6, and the last inequality follows from
Lemma 5.5 and because cost functions aremonotone nondecreasing. We use Lemma 5.7
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to conclude that the pure price of anarchy is at most(
3
4
γ + (1 − γ )
)−1
= 4
4 − γ ≤
4 − 2α¯
3 − α¯ .
6. NONATOMIC CONGESTION GAMES
In this section, we turn our attention to studying nonatomic congestion games, as
defined in Section 2.1.2. We first prove that such games always have Nash equilibria
for arbitrary altruism distributions and delay functions.
THEOREM 6.1. Each instance (E, r, d, (ψi)) of a nonatomic congestion game with
(nonuniform) altruism has a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. Theorem 1 of Mas-Colell [1984] proves that each game of infinitely many
players has a Nash equilibrium. A game is characterized by a distribution (Borel
measure) over utility functions which are continuous in the action of the player and
the distribution of actions by the remaining players. It is easy to see that each player
in the congestion game has a utility function −d(α)S ( f ) continuous in the choice of
strategy S ∈ S (trivially, since each strategy space S is finite) and in the distribution
of other players’ strategies f (by continuity of each de). The utility for sets S /∈ S is
−∞ (or a suitably negative constant). The distribution of altruism values α implies
a corresponding distribution over utility functions. Thus, the theorem of Mas-Collel
[1984] implies the existence of Nash equilibria for nonatomic congestion games.
The proof of Mas-Collel is inherently nonconstructive; accordingly, Theorem 6.1 does
not imply any algorithm for finding such equilibria. Indeed, even if the altruism dis-
tribution has support of size 2, we are not aware of an algorithm for finding a Nash
equilibrium.
Another difficulty arising for general altruism distributions is that the price of anar-
chy can easily become unbounded. Indeed, even if the altruism distribution has support
{0,1} with an arbitrarily large average altruism level α¯ < 1, a result on Stackelberg
routing due to Bonifaci et al. [2007] implies that the price of anarchy can become un-
bounded. This result applies even in the case when facilities are edges of a graph, and
all players are of the same type, with feasible sets consisting of all s-t paths for a fixed
pair (s, t) of nodes.
In order to address this prohibitive negative result, we focus on two special cases:
first, we consider the case of uniform altruism; subsequently, we focus on symmetric
singleton congestion games with arbitrary altruism distributions (see Section 7).
6.1. Uniform Altruism
In this section, we focus on the case of uniformly altruistic players. Furthermore,
we assume that all latency functions de are semiconvex. Then, there is an explicit
characterization of pure Nash equilibria via a convex program.
PROPOSITION 6.2. Let (E, r, d, α) be an instance with uniform altruism α ≥ 0 and
semiconvex latency functions de. Then, the pure Nash equilibria are the optima of the
convex program
Minimize
∑
e
∫ fe
0 d
(α)
e (t)dt
subject to f is a feasible solution for (E, r).
The proof of this proposition is virtually identical to that of Proposition 2.6.1 from
Roughgarden [2005]. The proof there only uses the fact that each agent is minimizing
a sum of monotone increasing functions
∑
e ge( fe), in order to conclude that the Nash
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 2, No. 4, Article 17, Publication date: October 2014.
Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy 17:25
equilibrium minimizes the (convex) objective
∑
e
∫ fe
0 ge(t)dt. Thus, it applies equally to
ge(t) := d(α)e (t).
When there is an efficient oracle for feasible solutions for (E, r), the convex program
can also be solved in polynomial time. In particular, this is the case when E is the set of
edges in a graph, and the feasible sets of player type i are paths from si to ti, for some
source node si and sink ti. In that case, feasible solutions are exactly multi-commodity
flows of rates ri.
Nash equilibria can be characterized by the following variational inequality, which
we will use below. The proof is in Appendix C.
PROPOSITION 6.3. Let (E, r, d, α) be an instance with uniform altruism α ≥ 0. Then, f
is a Nash equilibrium for α-altruistic players if and only if it minimizes
∑
S⊆E d
(α)
S ( f ) f˜S
over all solutions f˜ feasible for (E, r).
As an easy warm-up, we give a simple proposition bounding the pure price of anarchy
for arbitrary congestion games with semiconvex delay functions.
PROPOSITION 6.4. If all delay functions de are nondecreasing and semiconvex, then for
all congestion games, and any altruism level α ∈ (0,1], the pure price of anarchy is at
most 1/α.
PROOF. Let fˆ be a pure Nash equilibrium flow, minimizing the potential function
( f ) = ∑e ∫ fe0 d(α)e (t)dt, the objective function of the convex program in Proposition 6.2.
Also, let f ∗ be the optimum flow, minimizing the total cost C( f ) = ∑e ∫ fe0 (tde(t))′dt.
Simply from the definition of d(α)e (t), it follows that for any flow f , we have ( f ) ≤
C( f ) ≤ 1
α
( f ). Applying the first inequality to f ∗ and the second to fˆ , and using the
optimality of fˆ for , we obtain
C( fˆ ) ≤ 1
α
( fˆ ) ≤ 1
α
( f ∗) ≤ 1
α
C( f ∗).
More generally, we derive a result bounding the robust price of anarchywhen all delay
functions de are drawn from a given class of delay functions. As a special case of this
general result, we will derive the same bound of 1/α as a robust price of anarchy when
the delay functions are arbitrary increasing semiconvex functions. Our characterization
will be in terms of the anarchy value σ (α)(C) of a set C of functions for α-altruistic players,
which is defined as a generalization of the anarchy value of functions in Roughgarden
[2005].
Definition 6.5.
(1) For any delay function d, the anarchy value σ (α)(d) of d for α-altruistic players is
defined as
σ (α)(d) = sup
r,x≥0
r · d(r)
x · d(x) + (r − x) · d(α)(r) , (13)
where 0/0 is defined to be 1.
(2) For any class C of delay functions, the anarchy value for α-altruistic players σ (α)(C)
is
sup
d∈C,d=0
σ (α)(d).
The motivation for this definition of σ (α)(d) is that it captures the price of anarchy
for uniformly α-altruistic symmetric players with two facilities, where one facility has
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delay function d and the other has a worst-case constant. Indeed, we will prove this to
be the case in Lemma 6.10. Notice that Lemma 6.10 immediately implies that σ (α)(C)
is a lower bound on the pure price of anarchy in the worst case when all facility delay
functions are chosen from C. Our main theorem in this section shows that it is also an
upper bound on the coarse price of anarchy for all networks and arbitrary commodities.
THEOREM 6.6. Let C be a set of delay functions, and G = (E, r, d, α) an instance with
delay functions de ∈ C and uniform altruism α. Then, the coarse price of anarchy is at
most σ (α)(C).
PROOF. Let f, f ′ be any two feasible flows. By rearranging Definition 6.5, we obtain
the bound
x · de(x) ≥ r · de(r)
σ (α)(C) + (x − r) · d
(α)
e (r)
for any x, r ≥ 0. Applying this bound to each facility e, with x = f ′e and r = fe, we get
that
C( f ′) =
∑
e∈E
f ′ede( f
′
e)
≥ 1
σ (α)(C) ·
∑
e∈E
fede( fe) +
∑
e∈E
( f ′e − fe) · d(α)e ( fe)
= C( f )
σ (α)(C) +
∑
e∈E
( f ′e − fe) · (de( fe) + α fed′e( fe))
= C( f ) ·
(
1
σ (α)(C) − 1
)
+
∑
e∈E
( f ′ede( fe) + ( f ′e − fe) · α fed′e( fe)).
Rearranging gives us that∑
e∈E
( f ′ede( fe) + ( f ′e − fe) · α fed′e( fe)) ≤ C( f ′) +
(
1 − 1
σ (α)(C)
)
· C( f ).
Hence, the game is (1,1− 1
σ (α)(C) , α)-smooth, and Proposition 3.6 implies that the coarse
price of anarchy is at most σ (α)(C).
As a corollary of Theorem 6.6 whose proof is in Appendix C, we obtain a tight bound
in the case where the delay functions are polynomials of degree at most p with non-
negative coefficients. We denote this class by Cp.
THEOREM 6.7. If (E, r, d, α) has delay functions in Cp, then the coarse price of anarchy
is at most ((
1 + αp
1 + p
)1/p(1 + αp
1 + p − 1 − αp
)
+ 1 + αp
)−1
.
It is not difficult to verify that the previous bound converges to 1
α
as p → ∞; the
worst-case behavior is in fact attained with polynomials of high degree. However, for
p = 1, Theorem 6.7 also allows us to obtain a tighter bound in the special case that all
delay functions are linear.
COROLLARY 6.8. If (E, r, d, α) has linear delay functions, then the coarse price of an-
archy is at most 43+2α−α2 .
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Remark 6.9. Notice that for any α > 0, this bound improves on the bound by
Roughgarden and Tardos [2000] of 4/3 when all players are completely selfish. As the
bound is also shown to be tight, it characterizes exactly the gain by altruismwith linear
delay functions. Also notice that the bound for nonatomic games is significantly better
than the bound of 5+4α2+α from Theorem 4.1 for arbitrary atomic linear congestion games,
and slightly better than the bound of 4/(3+α) from Theorem 5.1. This improved bound
results from the fact that players are nonatomic, avoiding the cost of slight “rounding
issues.”
Finally, we show that the bounds derived in Theorem 6.6 are indeed tight, even for
the pure price of anarchy in symmetric singleton congestion games with two facilities:
LEMMA 6.10. Consider a symmetric singleton congestion game with two facilities and
flow rate r = 1. Let the delay functions be d1(x) = d(x) for the first facility, and the
constant delay function d2(x) = d(α)(1) = d(1) + αd′(1) for the second facility. The pure
price of anarchy of this instance is σ (α)(d).
PROOF. It is easy to observe from the definition of d2 that all α-altruistic players will
end up using facility 1, so that the total cost of the Nash equilibrium is d(1), while the
socially optimum solution has total cost
inf
x≤1
(x · d(x) + (1 − x) · d(1) + α(1 − x)d′(1)).
Hence, the pure price of anarchy is exactly σ (d).
By applying this characterization together with Theorem 6.7 and letting the degree
of the polynomial go to ∞, we obtain instances (E, r, d, α) whose price of anarchy
approaches 1/α arbitrarily closely. Similarly, by choosing p = 1, we obtain that the
bound in Corollary 6.8 is tight.
7. NONATOMIC SYMMETRIC SINGLETON CONGESTION GAMES
We next extend our study to the case of arbitrary distributions ψ of altruism. In light of
the negative result of Bonifaci et al. [2007], who proved an unbounded price of anarchy
even for the case of symmetric congestion games, we focus on the case of symmetric
singleton congestion games. Recall that such games naturally model the assignment of
infinitesimally small jobs to machines with load-dependent delays. Our main theorem
in this section gives a (tight) upper bound on the pure price of anarchy in nonatomic
symmetric singleton congestion games with arbitrary sets of (convex) delay functions
closed under addition of constants.
THEOREM 7.1. Let C be a set of convex and nondecreasing functions closed under
addition of constants; that is, if d ∈ C, then dˆ(x) = d(x) + c is in C for every constant c.
Then, for every nonatomic symmetric singleton congestion game (with arbitrary altruism
distribution ψ), the pure price of anarchy is at most(∫ 1
0
ψ(t)
1
σ (t)(C)dt
)−1
.
Before proving Theorem 7.1, we observe and prove several interesting corollaries.
First, we obtain a much simplified bound when C is the set of all semiconvex non-
decreasing functions.
COROLLARY 7.2. If all delay functions de are semiconvex and nondecreasing, then for
any nonatomic symmetric singleton congestion game with arbitrary altruism density
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distribution ψ , the pure price of anarchy is at most 1/α¯, where α¯ is the average altruism
under ψ .
PROOF. If C is specifically the set of all increasing semiconvex functions, Proposi-
tion 6.4 implies that 1
σ (t)(C) ≥ t. Substituting this bound into the integral in Theorem 7.1
gives us that the pure price of anarchy is at most (
∫ 1
0 ψ(t) t dt)
−1 = 1/α¯.
In turn, an immediate corollary of Corollary 7.2 can be obtained by choosing the
distribution ψ to have a λ fraction of completely altruistic players, and a 1− λ fraction
of completely selfish ones. As discussed in Section 1.3, such a scenario corresponds to a
Stackelberg scheduling game with a centrally controlled fraction λ of jobs. Since α¯ = λ
for this distribution, Corollary 7.2 immediately implies:
COROLLARY 7.3. In symmetric singleton congestion games, the pure price of anarchy
under Stackelberg scheduling with a λ-fraction of jobs being controlled by a central
authority is at most 1/λ.
This result was already proved constructively (and giving efficient algorithms) by
Roughgarden [2004]; nevertheless, it is interesting that it follows directly from our
general result. More generally, by using the same distribution with support {0,1} in
Theorem 7.1, we obtain the following corollary:
COROLLARY 7.4. In symmetric singleton congestion games, the pure price of anarchy
under Stackelberg scheduling with a λ-fraction of jobs controlled by a central authority
is at most ( 1−λ
σ (C) + λ)−1.
Corollary 7.4 improves (albeit in a nonconstructive way) a result of Swamy [2007]
for Stackelberg scheduling: we bound the PoA under Stackelberg scheduling by the
weighted harmonic mean of the PoA for selfish and altruistic players, whereas Swamy’s
bounds give the arithmetic mean. It is known that the harmonic mean is always
bounded above by the arithmetic mean.
We can also show that the case of Stackelberg scheduling is in fact the worst case for
the bound of Theorem 7.1, in the sense that the right-hand side is maximized. While
the bound of Theorem 7.1 will in general not be tight, this nevertheless gives rise to the
philosophical interpretation that, conditioned on a given average altruism level α¯, the
scenario in which completely altruistic players or a central authority compensate for
completely selfish players is the worst case, while uniform altruism throughout the
population is the best case. The proof is in Appendix D.
PROPOSITION 7.5. Conditioned on the mean of ψ being any given α¯, the quantity
(
∫ 1
0 ψ(t)
1
σ (t)(C)dt)
−1 is maximized when ψ has a point mass of α¯ on 1 and 1 − α¯ on 0.
It is minimized when ψ has a point mass of 1 on α¯.
7.1. Proof of Theorem 7.1
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 7.1. The proof ’s struc-
ture is similar to that of Theorem 5.3, although the proof is technically more involved,
since we allow arbitrary altruism distributions, while Theorem 5.3 only considered
altruism levels in {0,1}.
Let f be a pure Nash equilibrium flow. We first show that without loss of generality,
we can assume that each facility e contains only one type of players (i.e., if players have
different altruism values α, α′, then they do not share a facility) and that the support
of ψ is finite. To see this, assume that f has players of altruism values α < α′ sharing
a facility e. Now replace all players on e with altruism α by players with altruism α′.
f must still be a flow at Nash equilibrium for the new instance (because α′-altruistic
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players are on facility e in Nash equilibrium). By repeating this process, we eventually
obtain an instance with altruism density ψ ′ which stochastically dominates ψ and has
finite support. For this new ψ ′, the bound on the price of anarchy for f provided by
the right-hand side of Theorem 7.1 can only be smaller, giving us an even better bound
than required. Thus, we can from now on focus on the case described here.
Let 0 ≤ α1 < α2 < · · · < αk ≤ 1 be the (finite) support of ψ , where the rate of αi-
altruistic players is ri (so
∑k
i=1 ri = r). We need to show that for all flows g of rate r (in
particular, the optimum flow), we have
C(g) ≥ C( f )
k∑
i=1
ri
r
1
σ (αi )(C) ,
which we will do by induction on k. The base case k = 0 is of course trivial.
For the inductive step, let f be a Nash equilibrium, and g any flow of rate r. For each
i, let Ei be the set of facilities with positive flow of αi-altruistic players under f . Notice
that, by our assumption, the sets Ei are pairwise disjoint. For any set E′ of facilities,
let f (E′) = ∑e∈E′ fe (similarly, g(E′)) denote the total flow on E′. Let E′ := E\ E1 denote
the set of all facilities not used by α1-altruistic players.
Intuitively, because the more altruistic players prefer the facilities in E′ over E1,
we would expect a “good” flow g to do the same. Indeed, we first show that the delay
under f on all facilities in E1 is no larger than in E′, while the marginal cost, that is,
(x · d(x))′, is no larger in E′ than in E1. Let e ∈ E1, e′ ∈ Ej, j > 1 be arbitrary facilities
with positive flow f . Thus, all players using e have altruism α1, while all players using
e′ have altruism α j > α1. Because f is at Nash equilibrium,
de( fe) + α1 fed′e( fe) ≤ de′ ( fe′) + α1 fe′d′e′ ( fe′), (14)
de( fe) + α j fed′e( fe) ≥ de′ ( fe′) + α j fe′d′e′ ( fe′ ). (15)
Combining appropriately scaled versions of (14) and (15) gives us that
de( fe) ≤ de′ ( fe′), (16)
(1 − ξ )de( fe) + (α j − ξα1) fed′e( fe) ≥ (1 − ξ )de′( fe′ ) + (α j − ξα1) fe′d′e′ ( fe′ ), (17)
where ξ ∈ [0,1] is a scalar, which we can set later.
Our high-level strategy will be to bound the Nash equilibrium flow on E′ against a
restriction g′ of g of rate r − r1 on E′ by induction, and use a comparison argument
for the flow on E1. We will construct a flow h of rate r1 whose cost is cheaper than a
component of g of the same rate, and which is optimal for modified “residual” facility
costs. We can thus compare it against the flow f on E1 using Theorem 6.6.
Define f ′ to be the restriction of f to the set E′, that is, f ′e = fe for e ∈ E′, and f ′e = 0
for e ∈ E1. Thus, f ′ is a flow of rate r′ := r − r1. Define the modified delay function
d˜e(x) := de( f ′e + x) + α1 f ′ed′e( f ′e)
for all facilities e. Thus, d˜e(x) is the delay incurred by flow on e if f ′e is unalterable,
but not considered part of the actual flow, plus a suitable constant term to “mimic” the
altruistic component. This definition of d˜e(x) implies that the perceived cost of facility
e to α1-altruistic players is
d˜(α1)e (x) = de( f ′e + x) + α1xd′e( f ′e + x) + α1 f ′ed′e( f ′e).
Thus, for e ∈ E′, we have that d˜(α1)e (x) ≥ d(α1)e ( f ′e) for all x ≥ 0, while for e ∈ E1, because
f ′e = 0, d˜(α1)e (x) = d(α1)e (x + f ′e). In particular, this implies that the α1-altruistic players
are at Nash equilibrium with respect to the modified delay functions d˜e(x). Hence, by
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Theorem 6.6, and because d˜e(x) = de(x) for all e ∈ E1, we get
C( f − f ′) = C˜( f − f ′) ≤ σ (α1)(C) · C˜( f˜ ),
where f˜ is an optimum flow of rate r1 with respect to the modified delay functions d˜e.
In order to compare f ′ against the part of g on the set E′, it will be useful to assume
that g(E′) ≥ f (E′). We will show next that we can make this assumption without loss
of generality. For assume that it did not hold. Then, let e ∈ E1, e′ ∈ E′ be facilities
with ge > fe > 0 and ge′ < fe′ . (The existence of e, e′ follows from the assumption
g(E′) < f (E′)). By the bound on the derivatives in Inequality (17), and using the
semiconvexity of the facility cost functions, we show that
(gede(ge))′ ≥ ( fede( fe))′ ≥ ( fe′de′ ( fe′))′ ≥ (ge′de′ (ge′))′
in the following. The first and last inequalities hold simply by the semiconvexity of de
and de′ . The second equality is obtained by setting ξ = 1−α j1−α1 to get 1 − ξ = α j − ξα1, so
Inequality (17) implies that
( fede( fe))′ = de( fe) + fed′e( fe) ≥ de′ ( fe′ ) + fe′d′e′ ( fe′) = ( fe′de′ ( fe′ ))′.
Thus, g can be made cheaper by moving some of its flow from e to e′. By repeating this
process, we can thus assume that g(E′) ≥ f (E′).
Let γ be such that C( f − f ′) = γC( f ). Because f ′ and f − f ′ use disjoint sets of
facilities, we get C( f ′) = (1 − γ )C( f ). (Notice that the assumption of disjoint sets is
indeed crucial. Due to the nonconstant cost of facilities, in general, it does not hold that
C( f ) + C( f ′) = C( f + f ′).)
By Lemma 7.6, we can decompose g = h + g′, where g′ is a flow of rate r′ entirely on
E′, and h is a flow of rate r1 satisfying the property (19), namely
C˜( f˜ ) ≤
∑
e
hede(ge) +
∑
e
g′e(de(ge) − de(g′e)).
We can thus apply induction on the flows f ′ and g′ of rate r′ on the modified instance
with facility set E′. Notice that while f ′ may not be an equilibrium flow on E, it is
indeed an equilibrium flow on E′. Thus, we obtain that
C(g) = C(g′) +
∑
e
h(e)de(ge) +
∑
e
g′e(de(ge) − de(g′e))
≥ C( f ′)
k∑
i=2
ri
r′
1
σ (αi )(C) + C( f − f
′)
1
σ (α1)(C) (18)
= C( f )
k∑
i=2
(
ri
r′
1
σ (αi )(C) · (1 − γ ) +
1
σ (α1)(C) · γ
)
.
We next show that γ ≤ r1r . By (16), every player on E1 incurs lower delay than every
player on Ej , and consequently on E′. Thus, the average delay 1r1 C( f − f ′) of players
on E1 is at most the average delay 1r C( f ) of all players, so C( f − f ′) ≤ r1r C( f ).
The lower bound (18) is a convex combination of the nonnegative terms
k∑
i=2
ri
r′
1
σ (αi )(C) and
1
σ (α1)(C)
with coefficients (1 − γ ) and γ , respectively, The anarchy value σ (α)(C) is a monotone
nonincreasing function of α, so the weighted average reciprocal anarchy value for
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altruism levels α2, . . . , αk is at least the reciprocal for α1. Thus, the convex combination
is minimized when the coefficient γ of the smaller term 1
σ (α1)(C) is as large as possible,
that is, when γ = r1/r. Substituting this bound,
C(g) ≥ C( f )
k∑
i=2
(
ri
r′
1
σ (αi )(C) ·
r′
r
+ 1
σ (α1)(C) ·
r1
r
)
= C( f )
k∑
i=1
ri
r′
1
σ (αi )(C) ,
completing the inductive step, and thus the proof.
LEMMA 7.6. Let f ′ be a flow of rate r′ using only facilities from E′, and define d˜e(x) :=
de( f ′e + x) + α1 f ′ed′e( f ′e). Let g be any flow of rate r = r′ + r1, with g(E′) ≥ r′. Let f˜ be the
optimum flow of rate r1 with respect to facility costs d˜e. Then, g can be decomposed as
g = h + g′, where g′ is a flow of rate r′ on E′, satisfying
C˜( f˜ ) ≤
∑
e
hede(ge) +
∑
e
g′e(de(ge) − de(g′e)). (19)
PROOF. Let  := g(E′) − r′ ≥ 0 be the amount of “excess flow” that g sends on E′,
compared to f . We begin by setting he = ge for all facilities e ∈ E1, giving us a flow of
rate r1 − . So we need to add  more units of flow to h. Let E′′ := {e ∈ E′ : ge ≥ f ′e}
be the set of facilities in E′ on which g sends more flow than f ′. Thus, we have that
g(E′′)− f ′(E′′) ≥ g(E′)− f ′(E′) = . In particular, we can define a flow h of total rate 
on E′′, such that he ≤ ge − f ′e for all e ∈ E′′. For all other facilities e, we set he = 0, and
thus obtain a flow h of rate r1, such that he ≤ ge for all facilities e. We then have that∑
e
hede(ge) =
∑
e∈E1
hede(he) +
∑
e∈E′′
hede(ge) ≥
∑
e∈E1
hede(he) +
∑
e∈E′′
hede( f ′e + he),
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of the delays de. Next, because
g′e ≥ f ′e for all e ∈ E′, and the delay functions are convex, (de(ge)− de(g′e))/he ≥ d′e( f ′e) for
all e ∈ E′′ with he > 0. Combining this bound with the fact that α1 ≤ 1, we obtain that
∑
e
g′e(de(ge) − de(g′e)) ≥
∑
e∈E′′
g′e(de(ge) − de(g′e)) ≥
∑
e∈E′′
f ′eα1hed
′
e( f
′
e).
Summing the previous two inequalities now gives us∑
e
hede(ge) +
∑
e
g′e(de(ge) − de(g′e)) ≥
∑
e∈E1
hede(he) +
∑
e∈E′′
hede( f ′e + he) +
∑
e∈E′′
heα1 f ′ed
′
e( f
′
e)
=
∑
e
hed˜e(he) ≥ C˜( f˜ ),
where the final inequality follows from the optimality of f˜ with respect to the delay
functions d˜e.
8. FAIR COST-SHARING GAMES
In this section, we analyze the robust price of anarchy of fair cost-sharing games. It is
well known that the pure price of anarchy is n [Nisan et al. 2007]. We show that the
pure price of anarchy can get significantly worse in the presence of altruistic players:
the following theorem gives an upper bound of n/(1 − αˆ), which we subsequently show
to be tight, even for the pure price of anarchy.
THEOREM 8.1. The robust price of anarchy of α-altruistic cost-sharing games is at
most n1−αˆ (with n/0 = ∞).
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PROOF. The claim is true for αˆ = 1 because RPoA(α) ≤ ∞ holds trivially. We show
that Gα is (n, αˆ,α)-smooth for αˆ ∈ [0,1). Let s and s′ be two strategy profiles. Fix an
arbitrary player i ∈ N. We have
C(s′i, s−i) − C(s) =
∑
e∈U (s′i ,s−i )
ce −
∑
e∈U (s)
ce ≤
∑
e∈s′i\U (s)
ce.
We use this inequality to obtain the following bound:
(1 − αi)Ci(s′i, s−i) + αi(C(s′i, s−i) − C(s)) ≤ (1 − αi)
∑
e∈s′i
ce
xe(s′i, s−i)
+ αi
∑
e∈s′i\U (s)
ce
xe(s′i, s−i)
≤
∑
e∈s′i
ce
xe(s′i, s−i)
≤
∑
e∈s′i
n · ce
xe(s′)
.
The first inequality holds because xe(s′i, s−i) = 1 for every e ∈ s′i \U (s), and the last
inequality follows from xe(s′i, s−i) ≥ xe(s′)/n for every e ∈ s′i. The left-hand side of the
smoothness condition (5) can be rewritten as
n∑
i=1
((1 − αi)Ci(s′i, s−i) + αi(C(s′i, s−i) − C(s)) + αiCi(s)) ≤
n∑
i=1
⎛
⎝∑
e∈s′i
n · ce
xe(s′)
⎞
⎠+ αˆC(s)
= nC(s′) + αˆC(s).
We conclude that the robust price of anarchy is at most n1−αˆ . Example 8.2 shows that
this bound is tight, even for pure Nash equilibria of symmetric singleton cost-sharing
games.
Example 8.2. Consider the (symmetric singleton) cost-sharing game in which nplay-
ers can choose between two different facilities e1 and e2 of cost 1 and n/(1− α), respec-
tively. Let s∗ = (e1, . . . , e1) and s = (e2, . . . , e2) refer to the strategy profiles in which
every player chooses e1 and e2, respectively. Then, C(s∗) = 1 and C(s) = n/(1− α). Note
that s is a pure Nash equilibrium of the α-altruistic extension of this game because for
every player i, we have
(1 − α)Ci(s) + αC(s) = 1 + α n1 − α = C
α
i ({e1} , s−i).
The pure price of anarchy is therefore at least n/(1 − α).
Intuitively, the reason that the price of anarchy can get worse in the presence of
altruism is that altruistic players worry more about hurting others with a strategy
change, and are thus more likely to be stuck in a suboptimal equilibrium. The same
phenomenon—being ready to accept more states as equilibria—should lead to a lower
price of stability. Indeed, we next show an improved upper bound for the pure price
of stability of uniformly α-altruistic cost-sharing games. Note that for the completely
selfish case α = 0, it is well known that the tight upper bound for the pure price of
stability is Hn. Clearly, this upper bound extends to the mixed, correlated and coarse
price of stability. The proof of the following proposition exploits a standard technique to
bound the pure price of stability of exact potential games (see, e.g., Nisan et al. [2007]).
PROPOSITION 8.3. The pure price of stability of uniformly α-altruistic cost-sharing
games is at most (1 − α)Hn + α.
PROOF. Let Gα be a uniformly α-altruistic cost-sharing game. It is not hard to verify
that Gα is an exact potential game with potential function α(s) = (1− α)(s)+ αC(s),
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where (s) = ∑e∈E∑xe(s)i=1 ce/i. Observe that
α(s) = (1 − α)
∑
e∈E
xe(s)∑
i=1
ce
i
+ α
∑
e∈U (s)
ce ≤ ((1 − α)Hn + α)
∑
e∈U (s)
ce = ((1 − α)Hn + α)C(s).
We therefore have that C(s) ≤ α(s) ≤ ((1 − α)Hn + α)C(s).
Let sbe a strategy profile that minimizes α, and let s∗ be an optimal strategy profile
that minimizes the social cost function C. Note that s is a pure Nash equilibrium of Gα.
We have
C(s) ≤ α(s) ≤ α(s∗) ≤ ((1 − α)Hn + α)C(s∗),
which proves the claim.
9. VALID UTILITY GAMES
In this section, we analyze valid utility games with altruism. Vetta [2002] proved a
bound of 2 on the pure price of anarchy for valid utility games with nondecreasing
V , and Roughgarden [2009] showed how this bound is achieved via a smoothness
argument. We extend this result to altruistic extensions of these games.
THEOREM 9.1. The robust price of anarchy of α-altruistic valid utility games is 2.
Note that, in this statement the claim holds for arbitrary nonuniform altruism.
PROOF. We show that the α-altruistic extension Gα of a valid utility game is (1,1,α)-
smooth.
Fix two strategy profiles s, s′ ∈ , and consider an arbitrary player i ∈ N. By
definition of a valid utility game, we have
i(s) ≥ (s) − (∅, s−i). (20)
Therefore, for each player i ∈ N,
(s′i, s−i) − (s) + i(s) = ((s′i, s−i) − (∅, s−i)) − ((s) − (∅, s−i)) + i(s)
≥ (s′i, s−i) − (∅, s−i). (21)
Now let Ui =
⋃n
j=1 sj ∪
⋃i
j=1 s
′
j . Recalling that −i(s) = (s) − i(s), and summing
over all i ∈ N,
n∑
i=1
((1 − αi)i(s′i, s−i) + αi((s′i, s−i) − (s) + i(s)))
≥
n∑
i=1
((s′i, s−i) − (∅, s−i)) ≥
n∑
i=1
(V (Ui) − V (Ui−1)) ≥ (s′) − (s).
Here, the first inequality follows from (20) and (21), the second inequality holds because
V is submodular, and the final inequality follows from V being nondecreasing. We
conclude that Gα is (1,1,α)-smooth, which proves an upper bound of 2 on the robust
price of anarchy. This bound is tight, as shown by Example 9.2.
Example 9.2. Consider a valid utility game G with two players N = {1,2}, a ground
set E = {1,2} of two elements and strategy sets 1 = {{1} , {2}} , 2 = {∅, {1}}. Define
V (S) = |S| for every subset S ⊆ E. Note that V is nonnegative, nondecreasing, and
submodular.
For a given strategy profile s ∈ , the individual payoffs 1(s) and 2(s) of player 1
and player 2, respectively, are defined as follows: 1(s) = 1 for all strategy profiles s.
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2(s) = 1 if s= ({2} , {1}) and 2(s) = 0 otherwise. It is not hard to verify that for every
player i and every strategy profile s ∈ , we have i(s) ≥ (s) − (∅, s−i). Moreover,
(s) ≥ 1(s) + 2(s) for every s ∈ . We conclude that G is a valid utility game.
Let α ∈ [0,1]2 be arbitrary, and consider the α-altruistic extension Gα of G. We claim
that s = ({1} ,∅) is a pure Nash equilibrium of Gα. The utility of player 1 under s is
(1 − α1) + α1 = 1. His utility remains 1 if he switches to the strategy {2}. The utility of
player 2 under s is α2. If he switches to the strategy {1}, then his utility is α2 as well.
Thus, s is a pure Nash equilibrium. Since (s) = 1 and (({2} , {1})) = 2, the pure price
of anarchy of Gα is 2.
10. GENERAL PROPERTIES OF SMOOTHNESS
Most of the analysis of games in this work (with the exception of symmetric singleton
congestion games) proved robust price of anarchy results using (λ,μ,α)-smoothness as
the key tool. In this section, we provide some general results about (λ,μ,α)-smoothness.
PROPOSITION 10.1. Let G be a class of cost-minimization games equipped with sum-
bounded social cost functions. The set
SG = {(λ,μ,α) : Gα is (λ,μ,α)-smooth for all G ∈ G}
is convex.
PROOF. Let G ∈ G be arbitrary. It suffices to show that
SG = {(λ,μ,α) : Gα is (λ,μ,α)-smooth}
is convex, because the intersection of any collection of convex sets is also convex.
Let (λ1, μ1,α(1)), (λ2, μ2,α(2)) ∈ SG be two elements in SG, and let γ ∈ [0,1] be arbi-
trary. For all pairs (s, s′) of strategy profiles of G, smoothness implies that
γ
n∑
i=1
(
Ci(s′i, s−i) + α(1)i (C−i(s′i, s−i) − C−i(s))
)
+ (1 − γ )
n∑
i=1
(
Ci(s′i, s−i) + α(2)i (C−i(s′i, s−i) − C−i(s))
)
≤ γ (λ1C(s∗) + μ1C(s)) + (1 − γ )(λ2C(s∗) + μ2C(s)).
By rewriting both sides of this inequality, we obtain
n∑
i=1
(
Ci(s′i, s−i) +
(
γα
(1)
i + (1 − γ )α(2)i
) · (C−i(s′i, s−i) − C−i(s)))
≤ (γ λ1 + (1 − γ )λ2)C(s∗) + (γμ1 + (1 − γ )μ2)C(s).
We conclude that G is (γ (λ1, μ1,α(1)) + (1 − γ )(λ2, μ2,α(2)))-smooth. Therefore, SG is
convex.
A natural question to ask is whether the robust price of anarchy is also a convex
function of α. This turns out not to be the case. For instance, the robust price of anarchy
for uniformly α-altruistic congestion games is 5+4α2+α (see Section 4), which is a non-convex
function. However, we can prove a somewhat weaker statement: For a subset S ⊆ Rn,
we call a function f : S → R quasi-convex iff f (γ x + (1 − γ )y) ≤ max( f (x), f (y)) for all
γ ∈ [0,1].
THEOREM 10.2. Let G be a class of games equipped with sum-bounded social cost
functions. Then, RPoAG(α) is a quasiconvex function of α.
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PROOF. Let G ∈ G. We show that for any α(1),α(2) ∈ Rn and γ ∈ [0,1],
RPoA(γα(1) + (1 − γ )α(2)) ≤ max(RPoA(α(1)),RPoA(α(2))).
Let 1, 2, . . . be a decreasing sequence of positive real numbers that tends to 0. More-
over, let (λ1,1, μ1,1,α(1)), (λ1,2, μ1,2,α(1)), . . . and (λ2,1, μ2,1,α(2)), (λ2,2, μ2,2,α(2)), . . . be se-
quences of elements in SG (where SG is as defined in the proof of Proposition 10.1) such
that for all j,
RPoA(α(1)) +  j = λ1, j1 − μ1, j and RPoA(α
(2)) +  j = λ2, j1 − μ2, j .
By Proposition 10.1, for all j,
n∑
i=1
(Ci(s′i, s−i) +
(
γα
(1)
i + (1 − γ )α(2)i
) · (C−i(s′i, s−i) − C−i(s)))
≤ γ (λ1, jC(s′) + μ1, jC(s)) + (1 − γ )(λ2, jC(s′) + μ2, jC(s))
≤ max(λ1, jC(s′) + μ1, jC(s), λ2, jC(s′) + μ2, jC(s)).
Hence, for all j,
RPoA(γα(1) + (1 − γ )α(2)) ≤ max
(
λ1, j
1 − μ1, j ,
λ2, j
1 − μ2, j
)
≤ max(RPoA(α(1)),RPoA(α(2))) +  j,
By taking the limit j → ∞, we conclude RPoA(γα(1) + (1 − γ )α(2)) ≤
max(RPoA(α(1)),RPoA(α(2))), which proves the claim.
The quasiconvexity of RPoAG implies:
COROLLARY 10.3. The altruism vectors α that minimize RPoAG(α) on the domain [0,1]n
form a convex set. The altruism vectors α that maximize RPoAG(α) on the domain [0,1]n
include at least one point that is a 0-1 vector.
11. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
At first sight, it might seem counterintuitive that the price of anarchy is greater than
1 when every player is entirely altruistic, that is, α = 1. This phenomenon is less
surprising when viewed from a local-search perspective. Note that for α = 1, all players
seek to minimize the social cost function C. A pure Nash equilibrium then corresponds
to a local optimum of C with respect to the neighborhood of single-player deviations.
Our bounds on the pure price of anarchy therefore also bound the relative gap between
the worst-case cost of a local optimum and the cost of a global optimum; this gap is also
known as locality gap and was introduced by Arya et al. [2004].
The phenomenon that the price of anarchy can get worse as the altruism level α
gets closer to 1 has been observed before (see Caragiannis et al. [2010]). The fact that
the price of anarchy does not necessarily get worse in all cases is exemplified by our
analysis of the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games and the pure price of
anarchy in symmetric singleton congestion games.
The most immediate future directions include analyzing atomic singleton congestion
games with more general delay functions than linear ones. While the price of anarchy
of such functions increases (e.g., the price of anarchy for polynomials increases expo-
nentially in the degree [Awerbuch et al. 2005; Christodoulou and Koutsoupias 2005]),
this also creates room for potentially larger reductions due to altruism. Similarly, the
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characterization of the robust price of anarchy of atomic altruistic congestion games
with more general delay functions (e.g., polynomials) is left for future work.
For games where the smoothness argument cannot give tight bounds, would a re-
fined smoothness argument like local smoothness in Roughgarden and Schoppmann
[2011] work? For symmetric singleton congestion games, this seems unlikely, as the
price of anarchy of pure and mixed Nash equilibria differ. It is also worth trying to
apply the smoothness argument or its refinements to analyze the price of anarchy for
other dynamics in other classes of altruistic games, for example, (altruistic) network
vaccination games [Chen et al. 2010], which are known to not always possess pure
Nash equilibria, or to find examples to see why smoothness-based arguments do not
work.
Our work also suggests several interesting directions for further research regarding
non-atomic congestion games. First, how far can the analysis with arbitrary altruism
distributions be extended? For network congestion games with arbitrary topologies
(and just one type of player), any improved result would prove the corresponding
bounds on Stackelberg routing, so the lower bound of Bonifaci et al. [2007] precludes
a general extension. However, an extension to restricted classes of network congestion
games (e.g., series-parallel graphs) seems plausible at this point. While we proved the
existence of Nash equilibria for all routing games with non-atomic players, regardless
of the distributions of altruism, the proof is nonconstructive. The work of Roughgarden
[2004] implies that finding the best Stackelberg strategy (and thus the best equilibrium
with altruism levels in {0,1}) is NP-complete. However, it would be interesting whether
other equilibria can always be found efficiently. Alternatively, in light of the PPAD-
completeness of finding Nash equilibria [Chen and Deng 2006], it may be possible
that finding Nash equilibria for network congestion games with two (or more) altruism
values is also PPAD-complete.
We have seen that the impact of altruism depends on the underlying game. It would
be nice to identify general properties that enable one to predict whether a given game
suffers from altruism or not. What is it that makes valid utility games invariant to
altruism? Furthermore, what kind of “transformations” (not just altruistic extensions)
might be applied to a strategic game such that the smoothness approach can still be
adapted to give (tight) bounds? More generally, while the existence of pure Nash equi-
libria has been shown for singleton and matroid congestion games with player-specific
delay functions [Ackermann et al. 2006; Milchtaich 1996], the price of anarchy (for pure
Nash equilibria or more general equilibrium concepts) has not yet been addressed.
Studying the price of anarchy in such a general setting (in which our setting with
altruism can be embedded) by either smoothness-based techniques or other methods
is undoubtedly intriguing.
APPENDIXES
A. PROOFS FOR SECTION 3.3
PROPOSITION 3.5. Let Gα be an α-altruistic extension of a game with sum-bounded
social cost function C. If Gα is (λ,μ,α)-smooth with μ < 1, then the coarse (and thus
correlated, mixed, and pure) price of anarchy of Gα is at most λ1−μ .
PROOF. Let σ be a coarse equilibrium of Gα, s a random strategy profile with joint
distribution σ , and s∗ ∈  a socially optimal strategy profile. The coarse equilibrium
condition implies that for every player i ∈ N:
E[(1 − αi)Ci(s) + αiC(s)] ≤ E[(1 − αi)Ci(s∗i , s−i) + αiC(s∗i , s−i)].
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By linearity of expectation, for every player i ∈ N:
E[Ci(s)] ≤ E[Ci(s∗i , s−i) + αi(C(s∗i , s−i) − Ci(s∗i , s−i)) − αi(C(s) − Ci(s))].
By summing over all players, using linearity of expectation and the sum-boundedness
of C, we obtain
E[C(s)] ≤ E
[
n∑
i=1
Ci(s∗i , s−i) + αi(C−i(s∗i , s−i) − C−i(s))
]
.
Now we use the smoothness property (5) to conclude
E[C(s)] ≤ E[λC(s∗) + μC(s)] = λC(s∗) + μE[C(s)].
Solving forE[C(s)] and exploiting thatμ < 1, now proves the claim. As coarse equilibria
include correlated equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria and pure Nash equilibria, the
correlated, mixed, and pure price of anarchy are thus also bounded by λ1−μ .
PROPOSITION 3.6. Let Gα be a uniformly α-altruistic nonatomic congestion game. If Gα
is (λ,μ, α)-smooth with μ < 1, then the coarse price of anarchy of Gα is at most λ1−μ .
PROOF. Let F be a coarse equilibrium of the game Gα. Thus, F is a distribution over
feasible flows f . Let f ∗ be a feasible flow minimizing C. Consider a player type S and
an infinitesimally small player of type S. F induces a distribution FS over flows fS for
players of type S, and thus also over strategies s ∈ S for those players. The distribution
satisfies Prob fS∼FS [s = S | fS ] = fS,S/rS . The expected cost of a player of type S under
F is thus
E(s, f )∼F
[∑
e∈s
de( fe) + α fed′e( fe)
]
= E f∼F
[∑
S∈S
fS,S
rS
·
∑
e∈S
de( fe) + α fed′e( fe)
]
(22)
= 1
rS
·
∑
S∈S
E f∼F
[
fS,S ·
∑
e∈S
de( fe) + α fed′e( fe)
]
, (23)
by linearity of expectation. Because F is a coarse equilibrium, it also satisfies
E(s, f )∼F
[∑
e∈s
de( fe) + α fed′e( fe)
]
≤ E f∼F
[∑
e∈s′
de( fe) + α fed′e( fe)
]
(24)
for every s′ ∈ S.
For each s′ ∈ S, we multiply (24) by f ∗S,s′ ; adding these inequalities for all s′ ∈ S;
substituting Eq. (23) and using that
∑
s′∈S f
∗
S,s′ = rS , then implies that
∑
S∈S
E f∼F
[
fS,S ·
∑
e∈S
de( fe) + α fed′e( fe)
]
≤
∑
S∈S
f ∗S,S ·E f∼F
[∑
e∈S
de( fe) + α fed′e( fe)
]
.
Summing over all types S, using linearity of expectation, and changing the order of
summation between (S, S) and e then gives
E f∼F
[∑
e
fede( fe) + α f 2e d′e( fe)
]
≤ E f∼F
[∑
e
f ∗e de( fe) + α f ∗e fed′e( fe)
]
,
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which can be rearranged to give
E f∼F[C( f )] = E f∼F
[∑
e
fede( fe)
]
≤ E f∼F
[∑
e
f ∗e de( fe) + α( f ∗e − fe) fed′e( fe)
]
.
By the definition of smoothness for nonatomic games (see Eq. (6)), the right-hand
side is upper-bounded by
E f∼F [λC( f ∗) + μC( f )] = λC( f ∗) + μE f∼F[C( f )].
Now, solving for E f∼F[C( f )] shows that E f∼F[C( f )] ≤ λ1−μ · C( f ∗).
PROPOSITION 3.8. Let Gα be an α-altruistic extension of a game with sum-bounded
social cost function C. Let s∗ be a strategy profile minimizing the social cost function C
of Gα, and let s1, . . . , sT be a sequence of strategy profiles in which every player i ∈ N
experiences vanishing average external regret, that is,
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
t) ≤
(
min
s′i∈i
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
′
i, s
t
−i)
)
+ o(T ).
The average cost of this sequence of T strategy profiles then satisfies
1
T
T∑
t=1
C(st) ≤ RPoA(α) · C(s∗) as T → ∞.
PROOF. Consider a sequence s1, . . . , sT of strategy profiles of an α-altruistic game Gα
that is (λ,μ,α)-smooth with μ < 1. For every i ∈ N and t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, define
δi,t = Cαi (st) − Cαi (s∗i , st−i).
Let t =
∑n
i=1 δi,t. We have
t =
n∑
i=1
Cαi (s
t) − Cαi (s∗i , st−i)
=
n∑
i=1
(
(1 − αi)Ci(st) + αiC(st) −
(
(1 − αi)Ci
(
s∗i , s
t
−i
)+ αiC(s∗i , st−i)))
≥ C(st) −
n∑
i=1
(
Ci
(
s∗i , s
t
−i
)+ αi(C−i(s∗i , st−i)− C−i(st))) ,
where the inequality holds because C is sum-bounded.
Exploiting the (λ,μ,α)-smoothness property, we obtain
C(st) ≤ λ
1 − μC(s
∗) + 1
1 − μt. (25)
By assumption, s1, . . . , sT is a sequence of strategy profiles in which every player
experiences vanishing average external regret, that is, for every i ∈ N, Inequality (8)
holds. We obtain that for every player i ∈ N:
1
T
T∑
t=1
δi,t ≤ 1T
(
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
t) − min
s′i∈i
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
′
i, s
t
−i)
)
= o(1).
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Using this inequality and (25), we obtain that the average cost of the sequence of T
strategy profiles is
1
T
T∑
t=1
C(st) ≤ λ
1 − μC(s
∗) + 1
1 − μ
n∑
i=1
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
δi,t
)
T →∞−→ λ
1 − μC(s
∗).
PROPOSITION 3.9. Consider a uniformly α-altruistic nonatomic congestion game Gα
that is (λ,μ, α)-smooth with μ < 1. Let f ∗ be a flow minimizing the social cost C, and
f 1, . . . , f T a sequence of flows in which every infinitesimal player y ∈ [0, r] experiences
vanishing average external regret in the following sense:
T∑
t=1
∑
e∈φt(y)
de
(
f te
)+ α f te d′e( f te ) ≤ min
Sˆ∈τ (y)
T∑
t=1
∑
e∈Sˆ
(
de
(
f te
)+ α f te d′e( f te ))+ o(T ).
The average cost of this sequence of T flows then satisfies
1
T
T∑
t=1
C( f t) ≤ RPoA(α) · C( f ∗) + o(1)
as T → ∞.
PROOF. Consider a sequence f 1, . . . , f T of flows with vanishing average external
regret in the sense defined here. Let φt be the corresponding mappings of strategies;
similarly, let φ∗ be a mapping from [0, r] corresponding to the optimum flow f ∗. For
every player y ∈ [0, r] and t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, define the difference in cost between y’s
strategy at time t and the cost y would incur by unilaterally choosing the strategy
φ∗(y):
δy,t =
∑
e∈φt(y)
(
de
(
f te
)+ α f te d′e( f te ))− ∑
e∈φ∗(y)
(
de
(
f te
)+ α f te d′e( f te )).
Applying the vanishing regret condition to player y, we obtain that 1T
∑T
t=1 δy,t ≤ o(1).
Let t =
∫ r
0 δy,tdy. By exchanging the integration and summation,
t( f t) =
∑
e∈E
f te de
(
f te
)−∑
e∈E
(
f ∗e de
(
f te
)+ ( f ∗e − f te )α f te d′e( f te )) ≥ C( f t) − (λC( f ∗) + μC( f t)),
by the (λ,μ, α)-smoothness property (6). Solving for C( f t), we obtain
C( f t) ≤ λ
1 − μC( f
∗) + 1
1 − μ( f
t).
Combining this bound with the vanishing regret condition, the average cost of the
sequence of T flows is
1
T
T∑
t=1
C( f t) ≤ λ
1 − μ · C( f
∗) + 1
1 − μ ·
1
T
·
T∑
t=1
δy,t → λ1 − μ · C( f
∗),
as T → ∞.
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B. PROOFS FOR SECTION 4
LEMMA 4.3. Without loss of generality, all delay functions are of the form de(x) = x.
PROOF. First, wemay assume that for every delay function de, the ae and be coefficients
are integers. This can be ensured by multiplying all coefficients among all facilities by
the least common multiple of all denominators. In the resulting game, all coefficients
are integers, the price of anarchy is the same, and so is the set of all equilibria.
Next, we can assume that be = 0 for all e ∈ E. To show this, we replace any facility
e ∈ E with delay function d(x) = aex+be by n+1 facilities e0, . . . , en with delay functions
de0 (x) = aex and dej (x) = bex for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We then adapt the strategy space i of each
player i as follows: we replace every strategy si ∈ i in which e occurs by the strategy
si \{e}∪{e0, ei}. There is an obvious bijection between the strategy profiles in the original
game and those in the new game, preserving the values of individual cost functions and
the social cost function. (Notice that this construction exploits the fact that all players
have unit weight, and would not carry over to weighted congestion games.)
Finally, for the same reason, we can also assume that ae = 1 for all e ∈ E. We
replace e with facilities e1, . . . , eae , each having delay function dei (x) = x, and adapt the
strategy space i of each player i by replacing each strategy si in which e occurs by
si\{e} ∪ {e1, . . . , aae }. Now, all delay functions are de(x) = x.
LEMMA 4.5. For all x, y ∈ N0, η ∈ [0,1] and β ∈ [0,1], and all γ ∈ [ 13 (1+η−2βη),1+η],
((1 + η)x + 1)y + βη(1 − x)x ≤ (2 + η − γ )y2 + γ x2.
PROOF. The inequality is equivalent to
((1 + η)x + 1)y + βη(1 − x)x − (2 + η)y2 ≤ γ (x2 − y2).
Assume that x = y. The inequality is then trivially satisfied because x ≤ x2 for all
x ∈ N0. Next, suppose that x > y. Then, we need to show that for all γ in the given
range,
γ ≥ ((1 + η)x + 1)y + βη(1 − x)x − (2 + η)y
2
x2 − y2 .
We show that the maximum of the expression on the right-hand side is attained by
x = 2 and y = 1. First, we fill in these values: the right-hand side evaluates to
1
3 (1 + η − 2βη) ≥ 0, and γ ≥ 13 (1 + η − 2βη) by assumption on γ . We now write x as
y + a, a ≥ 1, and rewrite the right-hand side as
f (y, a) = (1 + η)y + βη
2y + a +
(1 + βη)(y − y2)
a(2y + a) − βη.
Because we know that there are choices of y and a for which f (y, a) is positive (e.g.,
when y = 1 and a = 1), and because a only occurs in the denominators, f (y, a) reaches
its maximum when a = 1. So we assume that a = 1. When we then set y = 0, we see
that f (0,1) = 0, so f (1,1) ≥ f (0,1). When y > 1, we can write y as w +2, where w ≥ 0;
we can now further rewrite f (y, a) as
f (w + 2,1) = 2η − 6βη
2w + 5 −
(2 − η + 5βη)w + (1 + βη)w2
2w + 5 ≤
2η − 6βη
2w + 5 .
When 2η − 6βη is negative, this term is certainly less than f (1,1). When 2η − 6βη is
positive, we have
f (w + 2,1) ≤ 2η − 6βη
2w + 5 ≤
2η − 6βη
5
≤ 1
3
(2η − 6βη) ≤ 1
3
(1 + η − 2βη) = f (1,1).
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Thus, f (y, a) ≤ f (1,1) = 13 (1+ η−2βη); in particular, the inequality is always satisfied
when γ ≤ 13 (1 + η − 2βη).
The final case is when x < y. Then, the inequality we need to prove is equivalent to
γ ≤ (2 + η)y
2 − ((1 + η)x + 1)y − βη(1 − x)x
y2 − x2 .
We show that the minimum of the expression on the right-hand side is attained by
x = 0 and y = 1. First, we fill in these values: the right-hand side then evaluates to
1+η, so for all choices of γ , we do indeed have γ ≤ 1+η. We now write y = x +a, a ≥ 1,
and rewrite the right-hand side as
g(x, a) = (1 + βη)x
2 − (1 + a + (a + β)η)x − a
a(2x + a) + 2 + η.
Suppose first that x = 0 and that a ≥ 2. Then, we can write a as 1 + b, b > 0, and
therefore
g(0,1 + b) = 2 + η − 1
1 + b ≥
3
2
+ η ≥ 1 + η = g(0,1).
When x ≥ 1, we can write x = b + 1, b ≥ 0. We then have
g(1 + b, a) = 2 + η − 2 + η + (1 − η)b
2b + 2 + a +
(1 + βη)(b2 + b)
a(2b + 2 + a) .
The last of these terms is positive; hence,
g(1 + b, a) ≥ 2 + η − 2 + η + (1 − η)b
2b + 2 + a ≥ 2 + η −
2 + 1 + b
2b + 2 + a
≥ 2 + η − 1 = 1 + η = g(0,1).
This shows that g(x, a) ≥ g(0,1) = 1+ η for all x, a, and in particular, for the choices of
γ we allow, γ ≤ 1 + η ≤ g(x, a).
C. PROOFS FOR SECTION 6
PROPOSITION 6.3. Let (E, r, d, α) be an instance with uniform altruism α ≥ 0. Then, f
is a Nash equilibrium for α-altruistic players if and only if it minimizes
∑
S⊆E d
(α)
S ( f ) f˜S
over all solutions f˜ feasible for (E, r).
PROOF. By fixing a Nash equilibrium f ,
∑
S d
(α)
S ( f ) f˜S is the social cost of a feasible
solution f˜ , where the cost of each set S is the congestion-independent constant d(α)S ( f ).
If a flow f is at Nash equilibrium for α-altruistic players, then a player of type S selects
a set S ∈ S to minimize d(α)S ( f ), so
∑
S d
(α)
S ( f ) f˜S is minimized over all feasible solutions
f˜ . Conversely, if a solution f˜ is not at Nash equilibrium for α-altruistic players, a player
can decrease his (perceived) cost at f˜ by deviation. Thus,
∑
S d
(α)
S ( f ) f˜S (or, equivalently,∑
e d
(α)
e ( fe) f˜e) is not minimized.
THEOREM 6.7. If (E, r, d, α) has delay functions in Cp, then the coarse price of anarchy
is at most ((
1 + αp
1 + p
)1/p(1 + αp
1 + p − 1 − αp
)
+ 1 + αp
)−1
.
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PROOF. As observed in Roughgarden [2005], it suffices to focus only on polynomials
d(x) = axi with x ≤ p. For any instance (E, r, d, α) with arbitrary polynomials can be
equivalently transformed into one with only such monomials, by replacing each facility
with delay function de(x) =
∑p
i=0 aix
i by a set of p+1 new facilities, the ith of which has
delay function d˜e,i(x) = aixi. In order to compute the anarchy value σ (d) of a nonzero
polynomial function d(x) = axi, we first write x = λr in Eq. (13) and cancel out a factor
r, obtaining that
σ (α)(d) = sup
r≥0
max
λ≥0
(
λd(λr)
d(r)
+ (1 − λ)
(
1 + αrd
′(r)
d(r)
))−1
.
For any r, let λr ≥ 0 be the maximizer of this expression. Setting the derivative of the
expression to zero shows that λr must satisfy d(1)(λr) = d(α)(r). Notice that because
d(1)(0 · r) ≤ d(α)(r) ≤ d(1)(r)
and d(1)(·) is continuous, there is in fact a λ ∈ [0,1] solving the equation.
Next, we calculate λr in the special case d(x) = axi. Solving the equation d(1)(λr) =
d(α)(r) for λr gives us that λr = ( 1+αi1+i )1/i, which is independent of r. Thus,
d(λrr)
d(r)
= 1 + αi
1 + i and
d′(r)
d(r)
= i
r
.
Substituting these values into the expression for σ (α)(d) gives us that
σ (α)(d) =
((
1 + αi
1 + i
)1/i (1 + αi
1 + i − 1 − αi
)
+ 1 + αi
)−1
,
which is independent of a and increasing in i (by a derivative test). Hence, the largest
σ (d) is attained for d = xp, giving
σ (α)(Cp) =
((
1 + αp
1 + p
)1/p(1 + αp
1 + p − 1 − αp
)
+ 1 + αp
)−1
,
as claimed.
D. PROOF FOR SECTION 7
PROPOSITION 7.5. Conditioned on the mean of ψ being any given α¯, the quantity
(
∫ 1
0 ψ(t)
1
σ (t)(C)dt)
−1 is maximized when ψ has a point mass of α¯ on 1 and 1 − α¯ on 0.
It is minimized when ψ has a point mass of 1 on α¯.
PROOF. We will show that 1
σ (α)(C) is concave as a function of α. Both results then follow
readily from Jensen’s Inequality. To prove concavity, let p1, p2 ≥ 0 satisfy p1 + p2 = 1.
For any delay function d ∈ C, writing x = λr in Definition 6.5 and canceling a factor r
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gives us
1
σ (p1α1+p2α2)(d)
= inf
r,λ≥0
λd(λr) + (1 − λ)d(r) + (1 − λ)(p1α1 + p2α2)d′(r)
d(r)
= inf
r,λ≥0
(
p1(λd(λr) + (1 − λ)d(r) + (1 − λ)α1d′(r))
d(r)
+ p2(λd(λr) + (1 − λ)d(r) + (1 − λ)α2d
′(r))
d(r)
)
≥ inf
r,λ≥0
p1(λd(λr) + (1 − λ)d(r) + (1 − λ)α1d′(r))
d(r)
+ inf
r,λ≥0
p2(λd(λr) + (1 − λ)d(r) + (1 − λ)α2d′(r))
d(r)
= p1 1
σ (α1)(d)
+ p2 1
σ (α2)(d)
.
Finally, we take an infimum over all d ∈ C on both sides to complete the proof of
concavity.
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